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1 Introduction
One consequence of the financial crisis followed by political turmoil has been the perception of
high volatility in government policies in both the U.S. and in Europe.1 In this paper, we study,
from the viewpoint of the household, the welfare costs of the volatility of government purchases,
both in the aggregate and across different wealth holdings. We do so in a neoclassical model with
incomplete markets and a richly specified government sector, where we eliminate the volatility of
government purchases once and for all.
Most of the existing research on the consequences of fiscal volatility has focused on the aggre-
gate effects of short-run volatility fluctuations on various macroeconomic variables. In one study,
Baker et al. (2016) analyze Internet news and find a (causal) relationship between high policy un-
certainty and subdued aggregate economic activity. In another study, based on a New Keynesian
DSGE model, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015) find large contractionary effects of fiscal volatility
on economic activity accompanied by inflationary pressure, especially when the nominal interest
rate is at the zero lower bound. By contrast, we study the effects of permanently eliminating fiscal
volatility on household welfare with a particular emphasis on distributional aspects.2 In studying
the welfare effect of permanent changes in fiscal policy, we take a similar approach to McKay and
Reis (2016). They focus on permanent changes in the automatic stabilizer role of fiscal policy.
Our study complements theirs through its focus on government purchases rather than transfers
(see below for a more detailed discussion of the literature).
To quantify the welfare costs of fluctuations in government purchases for households, we follow
the approach of Krusell and Smith (1998) and use an incomplete market model where heteroge-
neous households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks in their labor income and discount factor
processes. We then calibrate this model with U.S. data, in particular data on U.S. wealth in-
equality. Our model has aggregate uncertainty arising from both productivity and government
purchases shocks. We thus specify government purchases shocks as the only fundamental source
of fiscal volatility.3 In line with the data, we further assume that government purchases shocks are
independent of aggregate productivity and employment conditions. Government purchases enter
the utility function of the households as separable goods.4
1This paper focuses on “fiscal volatility.” However, in describing the related literature, we follow the widespread
use in the recent literature and treat “fiscal uncertainty” and “fiscal volatility” as synonymous.
2There are a few exceptions in an older literature with either no or rather limited heterogeneity: Bizer and Judd
(1989), Chun (2001), and Skinner (1988).
3This might seem like an extreme assumption. It might be interesting to explore an alternative environment
where government purchases are at least partly endogenously determined (see, e.g., Bachmann and Bai, 2013a,b).
However, this assumption makes the implementation and interpretation of the thought experiment of eliminating
fiscal volatility clean and transparent, and is akin to the original thought experiment about the elimination of
business cycles in Lucas (1987, 2003).
4We consider other utility specifications with complementary and substitutable private-public good relationships,
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Because the government partially funds its expenditures through taxation, purchases fluctua-
tions generate volatile household-specific tax rates. To capture the distributional effects of fiscal
shocks through taxation, we model key features of the progressive U.S. income tax system. In a
progressive tax system, aggregate government purchases fluctuations may lead to changes in the
distribution of household-specific tax rates and thus to idiosyncratic after-tax income uncertainty.
We also employ an empirical aggregate tax revenue response rule, which includes government debt
and is estimated from U.S. data.
To eliminate fiscal volatility, following Krusell and Smith (1999) and Krusell et al. (2009),
we start from a stochastic steady state of the economy with both productivity and government
purchases shocks, and remove the fiscal shocks at a given point in time by replacing them with their
conditional expectations, while retaining the aggregate productivity process. We then compute
the transition path towards the new stochastic steady state in full general equilibrium. Based on
the quantitative solution for this transition path, we then compare the welfare of various household
groups in the transition-path equilibrium to their welfare level with both aggregate shocks in place.
Our results show that the aggregate welfare costs from fiscal shocks are fairly small. The
effect of removing fiscal volatility is equivalent to a 0.03% increase in the lifetime consumption on
average. This is comparable to the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations reported in Lucas
(1987, 2003), even though in our model aggregate (spending) fluctuations lead to idiosyncratic
uncertainty in income tax rate in addition to before-tax factor prices volatility, so that they, a
priori, may lead to larger welfare costs than in Lucas (1987, 2003) (see Krusell et al., 2009).
Our results also reveal interesting variations in the welfare costs of fiscal volatility along the
wealth distribution. The welfare gains of eliminating fiscal volatility are increasing in household
wealth according to the baseline specification, where the implementation of the progressive U.S.
federal income tax system and the aggregate tax revenue response rule is modeled to best match
the cyclicality of important moments of the U.S. tax system.
Since volatile tax rates pre-multiply labor income levels, they generate – loosely speaking
– multiplicative after-tax labor income risk.5 Just as with the additive labor endowment risk
in early incomplete market models, this after-tax labor income risk leads households to self-
insure through precautionary saving. Wealth-rich households can thus achieve a higher degree
of self-insurance relative to wealth-poor households. Consequently, from a precautionary saving
perspective, wealth-poor households should gain more when fiscal volatility is eliminated.
However, due to the multiplicative nature of the after-tax capital income risk, the tax-rate
respectively, in extensions to the baseline calibration.
5This is cleanest in a linear tax system. However, even in a progressive tax system, the fluctuating average tax
rates work like multiplicative after-tax income risk.
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uncertainty induced by government purchases fluctuations also creates a rate-of-return risk to
savings, which in turn, impacts the quality of capital and bonds as saving vehicles.6 In a realistic
incomplete asset market model where the after-tax return of all the financial assets is subject to
tax rate uncertainty, wealth-rich households have much larger exposure to such a rate-of-return
risk. As a result, from the rate-of-return risk perspective, wealth-rich households should gain more
when fiscal volatility is eliminated.
Finally, the distributional effects of eliminating fiscal volatility can depend on its effect on the
average factor prices.7 The precautionary saving and rate-of-return risk effects lead to endogenous
responses of the aggregate capital stock, changing both the pre-tax capital rate-of-return and real
wages. In our baseline specification, the aggregate capital stock first declines and then increases
after the elimination of fiscal volatility, causing a higher interest rate and lower wage rate in the
early transition periods followed by a reversal later on.
Whether the combination of these three effects favors the wealth-rich or the wealth-poor house-
holds depends in principle – as we will show – on the details of the implementation of the pro-
gressive tax system and the aggregate tax revenue rule. Under the baseline specification, which is
calibrated to best mimic the cyclical behavior of key moments of the U.S. tax system, the wealth-
rich households are significantly exposed to the rate-of-return risk caused by tax-rate uncertainty,
and they also benefit from changes in average factor prices. As a result, we find that the welfare
gains are increasing in household wealth. The first contribution of the paper is thus to provide
a calibration strategy that allows us to quantify the net effect of the precautionary saving, the
rate-of-return risk, and the average factor price effects.
In addition to our baseline, we consider alternative implementations of how the progressive tax
system and the aggregate tax revenue rule interplay. The distributional effects of fiscal volatility
vary in these exercises, and thus, despite their counterfactual implications, help us uncover the
mechanisms through which fiscal volatility influences economic welfare. A second contribution of
the paper is thus to map out the relationship between tax instruments in a progressive tax system
used to obtain the cyclical adjustment of the government budget and the distributional effects of
fiscal volatility.
We also consider three other fiscal regimes: a balanced budget regime with a progressive tax
system, a linear tax system, and a lump-sum tax system, with the latter two again allowing for
government debt. The welfare results under those three regimes are all in line with our baseline.
6Angeletos and Calvet (2006), in a seminal contribution on risk in incomplete markets, discuss this tension
between labor endowment risk and rate-of-return risk.
7There is also a direct utility effect because households are risk averse with respect to government purchases
fluctuations.
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In another variation, we show that when private and public consumption are complements, the
overall welfare gains from eliminating government purchases fluctuations are higher, because a
higher government purchases level leads to a higher marginal utility of private consumption when
taxes are high (because government purchases are large). Finally, motivated by recent policy
discussions of the possible permanence of heightened fiscal volatility, we examine the welfare
consequences of doubling the historical government purchases volatility level. Our results suggest
that the welfare effects of fiscal volatility are symmetric between zero and twice the pre-crisis
volatility of government purchases.
In addition to its substantive contributions, our study makes a technical contribution to the
literature. Specifically, we merge the algorithm for computing the deterministic transition path
in heterogeneous-agent economies from Huggett (1997) and Krusell and Smith (1999), and the
algorithm for computing a stochastic recursive equilibrium in Krusell and Smith (1998), to show
that an approximation of the wealth distribution and its law of motion by a finite number of
moments can also be applied to a stochastic transition path analysis. Recall that after fiscal
volatility is eliminated, our economy is still subject to aggregate productivity shocks. This solution
method should prove useful for other quantitative studies of stochastic transition-path equilibria.
Related Literature
Besides the general link to the literature on incomplete markets and wealth inequality (see
Heathcote et al., 2009 for an overview), our study is most closely related to three strands of
literature.
First, our paper contributes to research on the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations (see
Lucas, 2003 for a comprehensive discussion). As in Krusell and Smith (1999), Mukoyama and
Sahin (2006) and Krusell et al. (2009), we quantify the welfare and distributional consequences of
eliminating macroeconomic fluctuations. However, while these studies focus on TFP fluctuations,
we examine the welfare consequences of eliminating fluctuations in government purchases. Our
study complements theirs by examining fluctuations due to fiscal policy, arguably a more plausible
candidate fluctuation to be (fully) eliminated by a policy maker – they are, after all, the result of
a policy decision.
Second, our paper relates to the recent literature about the effects of economic uncertainty on
aggregate economic activity. Most of the research in this stream of literature has focused on the
amplification and propagation mechanisms for persistent, but temporary volatility shocks, which
are typically modeled and measured as changes to the conditional variance of traditional economic
shocks. These uncertainty shocks include second-moment shocks to aggregate productivity, and
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policy and financial variables, which are often propagated through physical production factor
adjustment costs, sticky prices, or financial frictions (see e.g., Arellano et al., 2016, Bachmann
and Bayer, 2013, 2014, Baker et al., 2016, Basu and Bundick, 2017, Bloom, 2009, Bloom et al.,
2012, Born and Pfeifer, 2014, Croce et al., 2012, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015, Gilchrist et al.,
2014, Kelly et al., 2016, Mumtaz and Surico, 2015, Mumtaz and Zanetti, 2013, Nodari, 2014, Pastor
and Veronesi, 2012, 2013, and Stokey, 2016). Other studies investigate the effects of uncertainty
in the (time-varying) parameters of monetary or fiscal feedback rules (Bi et al., 2013, Davig and
Leeper, 2011, and Richter and Throckmorton, 2015), or in the bargaining power parameter of
search and matching models (Drautzburg et al., 2017). Our study complements this literature by
focusing on the welfare and distributional effects of a permanent change in fiscal volatility.
Finally, our work contributes to the growing body of literature on macroeconomic policy in
heterogeneous-agent environments (Auclert, 2017, Bachmann and Bai, 2013a, Bhandari et al.,
2016, 2017a,b, Bo¨hm, 2015, Brinca et al., 2016, Dyrda and Pedroni, 2017, Ferriere and Navarro,
2017, Gornemann et al., 2016, Gomes et al., 2013, Hagedorn et al., 2017, Heathcote, 2005, Hedlund
et al., 2016, Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Kaplan et al., 2016, Li, 2013, McKay and Reis, 2016,
and Ro¨hrs and Winter, 2017). There is also a budding empirical literature on the distributional
consequences of policy actions: see Coibion et al. (2017) for the case of monetary policy and Giorgi
and Gambetti (2012) for the case of fiscal policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 discusses its calibration. Section 4 describes our solution method. Section 5 presents the
baseline findings on the welfare and distributional effects of eliminating government purchases
fluctuations, while Section 6 investigates these welfare and distributional effects in alternative
model specifications. We close in Section 7 with final comments and relegate the details of the
quantitative procedure to various appendices.
2 Model
Following Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993), we model an incomplete market setting where a
continuum of infinitely-lived heterogeneous households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks in their
labor efficiency processes. We also include aggregate productivity shocks as well as shocks to a
household’s discount factor, as in Krusell and Smith (1998). We then add aggregate uncertainty
from government purchases shocks. In our model exposition, we focus our discussion on the fiscal
elements.
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2.1 The private sector
Our households are ex-ante identical, with preferences given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, Gt) , (2.1)
where βt denotes the cumulative discount factor between period 0 and period t. In particular,
βt = β˜βt−1, where β˜ is an idiosyncratic shock following a three-state, first-order Markov process.
Furthermore, ct denotes private consumption, and Gt the public good provided by the government
(government purchases).
The strictly concave flow utility function has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) with
respect to a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregate of c and G,
u (ct, Gt) =
(
θc1−ρt + (1− θ)G1−ρt
) 1−γ
1−ρ − 1
1− γ , (2.2)
where γ is the risk aversion parameter and 1/ρ is the elasticity of substitution between c and G.
We discuss the details of the Gt-process in the next subsection.
Our households also face idiosyncratic employment shocks. We denote the employment process
by ε, which follows a first-order Markov process with two states {0, 1}. ε = 1 denotes that the
household is employed, providing a fixed amount of labor l˜ to the market, and is paid the market
wage, w. ε = 0 represents the unemployed state of a household who receives an unemployment
insurance payment that equals a fraction ω of the current wage income of an employed household.
We represent the aggregate production technology as a Cobb-Douglas function:
Yt = ztF (Kt, Lt) = ztK
α
t L
1−α
t , (2.3)
where Kt is aggregate capital, Lt is aggregate labor efficiency input, and zt is the aggregate
productivity level. zt follows a two-state (zg, zb) first-order Markov process, where zg and zb
denote aggregate productivity in good and bad times, respectively. Note that, because of the law
of large numbers, Lt equals (1 − ut)l˜, where ut is the unemployment rate. We also allow the
unemployment rate to take one of two values: ug in good times and ub in bad times. In this way,
ut and zt move perfectly together.
We now specify the standard aggregate resource constraint:
Ct +Kt+1 +Gt = Yt + (1− δ)Kt, (2.4)
where Ct represents aggregate consumption, and δ the depreciation rate.
The markets in our model are perfectly competitive. Labor and capital services are traded on
spot markets each period, at factor prices r(Kt, Lt, zt) = αztK
α−1
t L
1−α
t − δ and w(Kt, Lt, zt) =
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(1 − α)ztKαt L−αt . In addition, we assume that the households can trade one-period government
bonds on the asset market in each period t. For computational tractability, we follow Heathcote
(2005) and assume that government bonds pay the same rate-of-return as physical capital in
all future states in t + 1. Because of the assumed perfect substitutability between capital and
bonds, each household has access to effectively only one asset in self-insuring against stochastic
shocks. We use a to denote a household’s total asset holdings, i.e., the sum of physical capital
and government bonds.
2.2 Fiscal volatility and the government budget
Our model has three government spending components: government purchases, Gt, aggregate
unemployment insurance payments, Trt, and aggregate debt repayments, (1 + rt)Bt. Government
purchases are the only fundamental source of fiscal volatility. They follow an AR(1) process in
logarithms:
log (Gt+1) = (1− ρg) log (G) + ρg log (Gt) + (1− ρ2g)
1
2σgg,t+1, (2.5)
where ρg is a persistence parameter, log (G) is the unconditional mean of log (Gt), g,t+1 is an
innovation term which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance one, and σg is the
unconditional standard deviation of log (Gt). Note that the government purchases process is
independent of the process for aggregate productivity. As is well known and as we show below,
government purchases are roughly acyclical in U.S. quarterly data.
The aggregate unemployment insurance payment, Trt = utωwt l˜, depends on both the un-
employment rate, ut, and the size of the unemployment insurance payment for each household,
ωwt l˜.
We assume that government spending at time t is financed through a combination of aggregate
tax revenue, Tt, and new government debt, Bt+1. As in Bohn (1998) and Davig and Leeper (2011),
we model the aggregate tax revenue net of transfers (as a fraction of GDP) as an (increasing)
function of the debt-to-GDP ratio, making the debt-to-GDP ratio stationary. We can thus specify
the following tax revenue response rule for determining tax revenue:
Tt − Trt
Yt
= ρT,0 + ρT,Y log(
Yt
Y
) + ρT,B
Bt
Yt
+ ρT,G
Gt
Yt
, (2.6)
where (ρT,0, ρT,Y , ρT,B , ρT,G) is a vector of positive coefficients and Y is a constant number equal
to the unconditional mean of GDP in the ergodic distribution.8 Furthermore, ρT,Y captures the
8Y serves as a normalization to make the coefficients of the tax revenue response rule scale-free (we obtain Y
through a fixed-point iteration procedure as it endogenously affects the average income of the economy through
the tax revenue response rule). Also, while ρT,B > 0 is necessary for the debt-to-GDP ratio to be stationary, this
condition is not imposed. Instead, all coefficients in equation (2.6) are estimated from the data, and this estimated
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automatic stabilizer role of the U.S. tax system when ρT,Y > 0, and ρT,B and ρT,G reflect the
capability of the endogenous revenue adjustment system in maintaining long-run fiscal sustainabil-
ity. Note that our tax revenue response rule implies that the government purchases level (relative
to GDP) and the GDP gap are the main non-debt determinants of the primary surplus.
Given the total tax revenue in (2.6), we can use the government budget constraint to determine
the dynamics of aggregate government debt Bt+1:
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + (Gt + Trt − Tt). (2.7)
2.3 The progressive tax system
Because the distribution of the tax burden across households is important for quantifying the
distributional effects of fiscal policies, we model the tax system to approximate the current U.S.
tax regime as realistically as possible while maintaining a certain tractability. Specifically, the
government uses a flat-rate consumption tax and a progressive income tax to raise the aggregate
tax revenue Tt. The consumption tax is given by:
τ c(ct) = τcct. (2.8)
This specification allows the model to capture sources of tax revenue other than income taxes,
which in turn provides a total income tax burden that is in line with the data.
Following Castan˜eda et al. (2003), we specify the progressive income tax function as:
τy (yt) =

τ1
[
yt −
(
y−τ2t + τ3
)− 1τ2 ]+ τ0yt if yt > 0
0 if yt ≤ 0,
(2.9)
where (τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3) is a vector of tax coefficients and yt is taxable household income; or yt =
rtat + wtεt l˜.
9 The first term in the above equation is based on Gouveia and Strauss’ (1994)
characterization of the effective federal income tax burden of U.S. households.10 The federal
income tax accounts for about 40% of federal government revenue and is the main driver of
progressivity in the U.S. tax system (Piketty and Saez, 2007). The linear term, τ0yt, is used to
capture any remaining tax revenue, including state income taxes, property taxes and excise taxes.
With these tax specifications, a household’s budget constraint can be written as:
(1 + τc)ct + at+1 = at + yt − τy (yt) + (1− εt)ωw(Kt, Lt, zt)l˜. (2.10)
ρT,B just turns out to be positive.
9Unlike in Castan˜eda et al. (2003), where households cannot borrow and thus cannot have negative income, yt
can be negative in our model in rare cases, so that we have to specify the tax function also for the case of yt < 0.
10The definition of income in Gouveia and Strauss (1994) is total taxable income including realized capital gains,
which is consistent with our treatment in the model.
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Note that equation (2.6) specifies a tax revenue response rule to calculate the aggregate government
tax revenue. Equations (2.8) and (2.9), on the other hand, model the concrete tax instruments with
which the government collects tax revenue. These two sets of equations are compatible only if we
treat one of the parameters in equation (2.9) as an endogenous tax instrument, to be determined
in equilibrium, rather than a fixed tax parameter. We choose, in the baseline specification, τ1 for
this endogenous parameter, τ1,t, and denote the resulting tax function by τ
y(yt; τ1,t). Adjusting τ1
means that the top marginal (average) tax rates, τ0 +τ1, are the main instruments for the required
tax schedule adjustments.11 As we will show in Section 3, choosing τ1 to be the endogenous tax
instrument best matches certain time series evidence on the progressivity measures of the federal
income tax code documented in Gouveia and Strauss (1994). This adjustment can satisfy the
empirical tax revenue response rule that describes aggregate U.S. tax adjustments well, and,
more importantly, ensures the stationarity of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Consequently, we take the
empirical tax revenue response rule as given and endogenously adjust one aspect of the tax system
to make the two sets of equations compatible, as in Davig and Leeper (2011) and Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2015).
Given our tax function specification, we can now specify total tax revenue as follows:
Tt = τcCt +
∫ 1
0
[
τ0yi,t + τ1,t
(
yi,t −
(
y−τ2i,t + τ3
)− 1τ2 )] ∗ 1(yi,t > 0)di. (2.11)
Equation (2.11) defines an implicit function of τ1,t. Recall that Tt is governed by Gt, Yt, Bt, and
Trt through the tax revenue response rule specified in equation (2.6). This means that, for a
given inherited level of bond holdings, Bt, τ1,t fluctuates in response to changes in both Gt and
the income distribution. As a result, in our baseline model the aggregate volatility in Gt translates
into idiosyncratic tax rate uncertainty.
2.4 The household’s decision problem and the competitive equilibrium
In this subsection, we discuss the household’s dynamic decision problem, which is determined by
both the idiosyncratic state vector (a, ε, β˜) and the aggregate state vector (Γ, B, z,G), where Γ
denotes the measure of households over (a, ε, β˜). We begin by letting HΓ denote the equilibrium
transition function for Γ:12
Γ′ = HΓ(Γ, B, z,G, z′). (2.12)
11Both derivatives of equation (2.9) and equation (2.9) divided by yt converge to τ0 + τ1 for large yt. In Section
6, we examine three alternative specifications, where we let τ0, τ2, and τ3, respectively, be the tax instruments that
adjust endogenously.
12Note that z′, but not G′, is an argument of HΓ. This is because, in our setting, which reflects the setting in
Krusell and Smith (1998), the future z affects the employment transition process, while the G-process is independent
of other processes. Note that we also leave time subscripts and switch into recursive notation now.
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We next let HB denote the (exogenous) transition function for B, as described in equation (2.7):
B′ = HB(Γ, B, z,G). (2.13)
Finally, we let Θ denote the equilibrium function for the endogenous tax parameter τ1, which is
implicitly determined in equation (2.11):
τ1 = Θ(Γ, B, z,G). (2.14)
The dynamic programming problem faced by a household can now be written as follows:
V (a, ε, β˜,Γ, B, z,G;HΓ,Θ) = max
c,a′
{u(c,G) + β˜E[V (a′, ε′, β˜′,Γ′, B′, z′, G′;HΓ,Θ)|ε, β˜, z,G]}
subject to: (1 + τc)c+ a
′ = a+ y − τy (y; τ1) + (1− ε)ωw(K,L, z)l˜
y = r(K,L, z)a+ w(K,L, z)εl˜,
a′ ≥ a,
Γ′ = HΓ(Γ, B, z,G, z′),
B′ = HB(Γ, B, z,G),
τ1 = Θ(Γ, B, z,G),
where ε and β˜ follow the processes specified in Section 2.1, G follows the process specified in
equation (2.5), and a is an exogenously set borrowing constraint. Finally, we can summarize the
optimal saving decision for households in the following policy function:
a′ = h(a, ε, β˜,Γ, B, z,G;HΓ,Θ). (2.15)
Our recursive competitive equilibrium is then defined as: the law of motion HΓ,
13 individual
value and policy functions {V, h}, pricing functions {r, w}, and the Θ-function for the endogenous
parameter τ1, such that:
1. {V, h} solve the household’s problem.
2. {r, w} are competitively determined.
3. Θ satisfies equation (2.11) with the tax revenue response rule (2.6) replacing Tt.
4. HΓ is generated by h.
14
The economy without a fluctuating Gt is identical, except for the deterministic Gt-process.
13Note that since HB is exogenously determined by equation (2.7), it is not an equilibrium object.
14Note that, aggregate asset holdings in this economy equal K + B (capital and bonds are perfectly substi-
tutable for households). Therefore, HΓ and HB determine the evolution of the supply of physical capital, K. The
competitively determined r then clears the capital market.
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3 Calibration
In this section, we discuss our model calibration beginning with basic parameters. The frequency
of our model economy is quarterly. We parameterize the model to match important aggregate and
cross-sectional statistics of the U.S. economy (Table 1).
Table 1: Summary of parameters
Parameter Value Description Source / Target
Taken from the literature
1/ρ 1.00 Elasticity of substitution between c and G Standard value
γ 1.00 Relative risk aversion Standard value
α 0.36 Capital share Standard value
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate Standard value
l˜ 0.3271 Hours of labor supply of employed Normalization
(zl, zh) (0.99, 1.01) Support of aggr. productivity process Krusell and Smith (1998)
Πz,z′ See text Transition matrix of aggr. productivity process Krusell and Smith (1998)
(ug, ub) (4%, 10%) Possible unemployment rates Krusell and Smith (1998)
Πεε′|zz′ See text Transition matrix of employment process Krusell and Smith (1998)
ω 0.10 Replacement rate Krusell and Smith (1998)
τ2 0.768 Parameter in the progressive tax function Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Estimated from the data
τ0 5.25% Income tax parameter
τc 8.14% Consumption tax rate
ρT,B 0.0173 Debt coefficient of fiscal rule
ρT,Y 0.2820 Output coefficient of fiscal rule
ρT,G 0.4835 Government purchases coefficient of fiscal rule
(Gl/Gm, Gh/Gm) (0.951, 1.049) Size of the G-shock
ΠG,G′ See text Transition matrix of the G-process
Calibrated in the model
θ 0.7221 Weight on private consumption in utility Lindahl-Samuelson condition
Gm 0.2318 Value of the middle grid of the G-process Mean G/Y (20.86%)
a -4.15 Borrowing constraint Negative wealth share (11%)
ρT,0 0.1007 Intercept of tax revenue rule Average annualized B/Y (30%)
β˜m 0.9919 Medium value of discount factor Average annualized K/Y (2.5)
β˜h − β˜m, β˜m − β˜l 0.0046 Size of discount factor variation Gini coeff. (0.79)
Πβ˜,β˜′ See text Transition matrix of discount factor Top 1% wealth share (30%)
τ3 1.776 Parameter in the progressive tax function Mean of τ1 (25.8%)
3.1 Basic parameters
We set the relative risk aversion parameter γ = 1, and the elasticity of substitution between pri-
vate consumption and the public good 1/ρ = 1. To calibrate the weight of private consumption
in the utility function, θ, we assume that the Lindahl-Samuelson condition holds for our econ-
omy in the long-run. This means that there is efficient provision of public goods, i.e., there are
equalized marginal utilities from private and public goods. Mathematically, this is represented as∫ 1
0
(1−θ)/Gt
θ/cit
di = 1, on average over many time periods. With this procedure, θ is calibrated to
0.722.
We take other parameter values directly from Krusell and Smith (1998): the depreciation rate
is δ = 0.025, the capital elasticity of output in the production function is α = 0.36, and labor
supply is normalized to l˜ = 0.3271. We allow our aggregate productivity process, zt, to take
on two values, zg = 1.01 and zb = 0.99, with unemployment rates of ug = 0.04 and ub = 0.1,
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respectively. The transition matrix for zt is as follows:0.875 0.125
0.125 0.875 ,

where rows represent the current state and columns represent the next period’s state. The first row
and column correspond to zg. The transition matrix for the employment status, ε, is a function
of both the current aggregate state (z) and the future aggregate state (z′). There are thus four
possible cases, (zg, zg), (zg, zb), (zb, zg), and (zb, zb), corresponding to the following employment
status transition matrices:150.33 0.67
0.03 0.97 ,

0.75 0.25
0.07 0.93 ,

0.25 0.75
0.02 0.98 ,

0.60 0.40
0.04 0.96 ,

where the first row and column correspond to ε = 0 (unemployed).
We calibrate the borrowing constraint and the idiosyncratic time preference process to match
key features of the overall wealth distribution in the U.S. The borrowing constraint is set to
a = −4.15 to match the fraction of U.S. households with negative wealth holdings, 11%.16
β˜ takes on values from a symmetric grid, (β˜l = 0.9873, β˜m = 0.9919, β˜h = 0.9965). In the
invariant distribution, 96.5% of the population is in the middle state, and 1.75% is distributed
across either of the extreme points. The expected duration of the extreme discount factors is
set at 50 years, to capture a dynastic element in the evolution of time preferences (Krusell and
Smith, 1998). In addition, transitions occur only across adjacent values, where the transition
probability from either extreme value to the middle grid is 1/200, and the transition probability
from the middle grid to either extreme value is 7/77200. This Markov chain for β˜ allows our
model to generate a long-run U.S. capital-output ratio of 2.5, and a Gini coefficient for the U.S.
wealth distribution of 0.79. It also allows our model to match the wealth share of the top 1%
(Krusell and Smith, 1998). An accurate calibration of this moment is important because, as we
will show, the welfare effects of fiscal volatility for top wealth holders, characterized by high levels
of buffer-stock savings and high capital income, can be quantitatively rather different from those
for other households.
15The numbers are rounded to the second decimal point.
16We check that the total resources available to a household, taking into account unemployment insurance benefits
and the borrowing limit, are never negative under this calibration.
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3.2 Fiscal parameters
3.2.1 Fiscal volatility and tax revenue rule
To estimate the parameters related to fiscal volatility and the aggregate tax revenue rule, we use
U.S. quarterly data from the first quarter of 1960 to the last quarter of 2007. We restrict the
data window up to 2007IV because, arguably, fiscal policy was special during and after the Great
Recession and for calibration purposes we want to focus on “normal” times. We provide the details
of our fiscal parameter estimation in Appendix A. Here we briefly outline the general procedure.
For the government purchases process (equation 2.5), we use the Rouwenhorst method (Rouwen-
horst, 1995) to construct a three-state first-order Markov chain approximation to the AR(1) pro-
cess of the linearly detrended log(G) series.17 The middle grid point of the G-process, Gm, is
calibrated using the average G/Y -ratio in the data; see Appendix A.1 for the details.
To determine the parameters of our tax revenue rule (equation (2.6)), we first estimate the
federal revenue rule as in Bohn (1998) and Davig and Leeper (2011), and the state and local rule
without debt. We then take the weighted average of the federal rule and the state and local rule
to get the general government tax revenue function, the empirical counterpart of our model. We
describe the details of this procedure in Appendix A.2.
TR in equation (2.6) is aggregate unemployment insurance payments. We set the unemploy-
ment insurance replacement rate, ω, to 10% of the current market wage income, in line with the
data. From Stone and Chen (2014) we know that the overall replacement rate from unemploy-
ment insurance is about 46% of a worker’s wage, and its average pre-2008 benefits duration is 15
weeks. This translates to about 53% of a worker’s quarterly wage. In our case, since we spread the
unemployment benefits through the agent’s whole unemployment period and the average duration
of unemployment in the model is about 2 quarters, this translates to about 27% of the quarterly
wage level. Moreover, from Auray et al. (2014) we know that about 60% out of all the unemployed
workers were eligible for unemployment benefits from 1989 to 2012, and that about 75% of those
eligible for benefits actually collected them. Thus, we set our unemployment insurance payment
to be 10% of the market wage.18
3.2.2 Tax instruments
17Kopecky and Suen (2010) show that the Rouwenhorst method has an exact fit in terms of five important
statistical properties: unconditional mean, unconditional variance, correlation, conditional mean and conditional
variance. The last two properties are important for our elimination of fiscal volatility, where both the conditional
mean and variance matter for the transition-path equilibrium.
18Our calibration also matches the aggregate data on unemployment insurance well: 0.0049 for the average
unemployment insurance to output ratio (0.0041 in the data), and 0.0021 for its standard deviation, after removing
a linear trend (0.0019 in the data). In both the model and the data, the unemployment-insurance-to-output ratio
is countercyclical. Also note that in Krusell and Smith (1998), the unemployment insurance is treated as a fixed
amount, ψ, and calibrated to be about 10% of the long-run quarterly wage.
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Recall that to satisfy the tax revenue rule (equation 2.6) we need to treat one of the tax parameters
in the income tax function as an endogenous equilibrium object:
τ1
[
y − (y−τ2 + τ3)− 1τ2 ]+ τ0y. (3.1)
Which tax parameter we choose to be an endogenous variable then influences how the distribution
of the tax burden across income changes over the business cycles. We thus run the model with
each of τ0, τ1, τ2, and τ3 as the endogenous variable one by one, and examine the cyclicality of the
tax system in each case. We then select the case where the cyclicalities of both the tax parameters
and the (average) residual income elasticity (RIE, defined in equation 3.2) of the federal income
tax part in equation 3.1, a classical (inverse) summary measure of tax progressivity in the public
finance literature (see Musgrave and Thin, 1948), best match the data. RIE is the elasticity of
after-tax income to pre-tax income. It is a decreasing function of tax progressivity, because the
more progressive the tax system is, the smaller the proportional increase in the after-tax income,
compared to that in the before-tax income.19
RIE =
∫ 1
0
∂ (yi − τy (yi)) /∂yi
(yi − τy (yi)) /yi di =
∫ 1
0
1− τ1 + τ1 (1 + τ3yτ2i )−
1
τ2
−1
1− τ1 + τ1 (1 + τ3yτ2i )−
1
τ2
di. (3.2)
We focus on matching the cyclicality of tax progressivity because, as we show later, this turns out
to be the main determinant of the distributional effects of fiscal volatility. Gouveia and Strauss
(1999) provide U.S. time series data for the federal income tax system not only on RIE, but also
on their estimates of τ1, τ2 and τ3. According to this data, the RIE correlates negatively with
output and tax revenue net of transfers; see the first two columns of Panel A, Table 2. And the
first two columns of Panel B, Table 2, show that our model can obtain the right cyclicality of RIE
only when we use either τ0 or τ1 as the tax instrument to cyclically adjust the government budget.
The intuition for this result is: to have a negative correlation between the RIE and tax revenue
(a positive correlation between tax progressivity and tax revenue), the tax burden on income-rich
individuals from the federal income tax must increase with tax revenue. This means, given the
specification of our federal income tax function, that τ1 has to adjust instead of τ2 or τ3, because
adjustments in τ1 lead to differential changes in individual marginal tax rates proportional to
the existing progressive rates. In contrast, adjustments in τ2 or τ3 affect the poor- and medium-
income households more than the high income group, since they leave the highest marginal tax
rate unaffected.20
To make the further choice between τ0− and τ1−adjustments, we examine how τ0 and τ1
19In equation 3.2, τy refers, with a slight abuse of notation, only to the federal income tax part in equation 3.1,
because our data on RIE are from the federal tax system.
20Analytically, holding the income distribution constant, we can show that ∂RIE/∂τ1 is negative. By construc-
tion, ∂RIE/∂τ0 is zero holding the income distribution constant, so the negative correlation between RIE and the
tax revenue in the τ0-adjustment specification is solely driven by changes in the income distribution.
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themselves are correlated with tax revenue net of transfers.21 The third and fourth columns of
Table 2 report these two correlations in the data (Panel A), negative for τ0 and positive for τ1,
whereas the model implies positive correlations for both cases (Panel B), and hence τ1 appears
to be the driver for the empirical cyclicality of RIE. Therefore, we choose τ1 as the endogenous
equilibrium object in the baseline model. We thus show that time series data on the progressivity
of the U.S. tax system are informative of which tax instruments are likely to be used for cyclical
government budget adjustment. It is top marginal tax rates, which is also consistent with their
strong cyclicality as documented in Mertens and Montiel Olea (2013).
Table 2: Moments for tax instrument choice
A: Data (1966 - 1989)
ρ(RIE, Y) ρ(RIE, T-Tr) ρ(τ0,T-Tr) ρ(τ1,T-Tr) ρ(τ2,T-Tr) ρ(τ3,T-Tr)
-0.3353 -0.3652 -0.1865 0.3235 -0.2184 -0.0344
B: Model simulation
ρ(RIE, Y) ρ(RIE, T-Tr) ρ(τ0,T-Tr) ρ(τ1,T-Tr) ρ(τ2,T-Tr) ρ(τ3,T-Tr)
τ0-adjustment -0.2978 -0.3108 0.3986 - - -
(0.2689) (0.2675) (0.3056) - - -
τ1-adjustment -0.2900 -0.3803 - 0.2999 - -
(0.3187) (0.3077) - (0.2788) - -
τ2-adjustment 0.2887 0.3744 - - -0.3333 -
(0.2105) (0.1951) - - (0.2320) -
τ3-adjustment 0.1615 0.2478 - - - 0.3261
(0.2886) (0.2880) - - - (0.2199)
Notes: In Panel A, Y and T − Tr are HP-filtered (with a smoothing parameter of 6.25) real log series of out-
put and tax revenue net of transfers, respectively. τ0, τ1, τ2 and τ3 are linearly-detrended tax parameters,
where τ0 is estimated by the authors (see Appendix A.3) and τ1, τ2 and τ3 are from Gouveia and Strauss
(1999). RIE is the quadratic-detrended residual income elasticity from Gouveia and Strauss (1999). In Panel
B, all variables are defined and filtered the same way as those in Panel A. The reported numbers are the av-
erage values from 2,000 independent simulations of the same length as the data (24 years), where quarterly
data are converted to annual data to match the data frequency in Panel A. We show the standard deviations
across these simulations in parentheses.
We then calibrate the remaining tax parameters in the progressive part of the income tax
function based on the values estimated by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) for U.S. data from 1989
(see Castan˜eda et al., 2003 and Conesa and Kru¨ger, 2006), the last year in their sample. Note
that equation 3.1 is linearly homogeneous in y, if τ3 is readjusted appropriately. Therefore, we
use their values for τ2 (0.768), and calibrate τ3 such that the average value of τ1 from the model
matches the estimated value from Gouveia and Strauss (1994).22
For the consumption tax rate and the linear part of the income tax function, we follow standard
procedures and calculate the time series of the corresponding tax rates from the quarterly NIPA
21The time series of τ1, τ2, and τ3 are reported in Gouveia and Strauss (1999), while that of τ0 is obtained from
our own estimation (see below and Appendix A.3). For completeness we also report the correlations for τ2 and τ3,
although these two models do not pass our first criterion for model selection.
22Note that the estimation in Gouveia and Strauss (1994) is carried out on annual federal income tax data,
whereas our model frequency is quarterly. Given the nonlinear nature of the tax function (equation (3.1)), this may
raise a time aggregation issue. We therefore checked the implied tax function from simulated annual income and
annual tax payment data from our model (aggregated from simulated quarterly observations). The results from
this estimation are very close to those from the annual data.
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data (see, e.g., Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015 and Mendoza et al., 1994). We then take the
time-series average values to obtain the following tax rates: τc = 8.14% and τ0 = 5.25%; see
Appendix A.3 for the details.
3.3 The wealth distribution and business cycle moments
In this section, we examine the wealth distribution and the business cycle moments, focusing on
the fiscal variables, generated by our calibrated model. For our model to be a suitable laboratory
for the experiment of eliminating fiscal volatility, and for producing reliable quantitative answers
to our welfare and distributional questions, it should broadly match these aspects of the data.
Table 3 compares the long-run wealth distribution generated by our model with both the
data and the model results in Krusell and Smith (1998). From Table 3, we see that our wealth
distribution is a good match for the U.S. wealth distribution, especially for those in the top 1
percent.23
Table 3: Wealth distribution
% of wealth held by top Fraction with Gini
1% 5% 10% 20% 30% wealth< 0 coefficient
Model 31% 59% 71% 80% 86% 10% 0.78
K&S 24% 54% 72% 87% 91% 11% 0.81
Data 30% 51% 64% 79% 88% 11% 0.79
Notes: The wealth distribution in the data is taken from Krusell and Smith (1998).
Household wealth in our model is the sum of physical capital and government bonds.
Table 4 provides the results of a comparison between the key business cycle moments gener-
ated by the model and those from the data. This comparison includes output, tax revenue, and
government purchases volatility and persistence. We calculate the same moments for the output
ratios of tax revenue, government purchases and federal government debt. Finally, we examine
the co-movements of these series with output and government purchases.
From Table 4, we see that our baseline model is successful in matching most of the business
cycle moments, with the exception of output volatility (which is about 70% larger in the model).
We checked that, even without fiscal volatility, as in Krusell and Smith (1998), the model produces
higher output fluctuations than found in the data, while the introduction of fiscal volatility does
not contribute substantially to the volatility of output. To check whether our welfare results are
affected by this feature of the model, we conduct a robustness check where we recalibrate the
aggregate productivity process so that the model matches the output volatility in the data. The
23While Krusell and Smith (1998) exogenously fix the share of households in each extreme β˜ state at 10%, we
use this share as a parameter to be calibrated to target the top 1% wealth share. This calibration makes that share
1.75%.
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Table 4: Business cycle moments
A: Data (1960 I - 2007 IV)
Y T-Tr G (T-Tr/Y) (G/Y) (B/Y)
Standard deviation 0.0149 0.0543 0.0134 0.0123 0.0083 0.0772
Autocorrelation 0.8616 0.8134 0.7823 0.9045 0.9573 0.9945
Corr(Y,X) 1 0.7242 0.0992 0.4791 -0.3826 -0.0472
Corr(G,X) 0.0992 0.0352 1 0.0345 0.4806 -0.0281
B: Model simulation
Y T-Tr G (T-Tr/Y) (G/Y) (B/Y)
Standard deviation 0.0235 0.0414 0.0123 0.0063 0.0086 0.0403
(0.0018) (0.0043) (0.0025) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0151)
Autocorrelation 0.5840 0.5870 0.6978 0.8183 0.8252 0.9732
(0.0561) (0.0558) (0.0582) (0.0575) (0.0546) (0.0341)
Corr(Y,X) 1 0.9892 -0.0012 0.6941 -0.6436 -0.1822
(0) (0.0043) (0.1294) (0.1053) (0.0939) (0.1685)
Corr(G,X) -0.0012 0.1316 1 0.2499 0.3805 -0.0089
(0.1294) (0.1296) (0) (0.1121) (0.1079) (0.0577)
Notes: In Panel A, Y, T − Tr and G are HP-filtered (with a smoothing parameter of 1600) real log
series of output, tax revenue net of transfers and government purchases, respectively. (T −Tr)/Y ,
G/Y and B/Y are linearly detrended output ratios of tax revenue net of transfers, government pur-
chases and federal government debt, respectively. The data sources are documented in Appendix
A.2. In Panel B, all variables are defined and filtered the same way as those in Panel A. The re-
ported numbers are the average values from 1,000 independent simulations of the same length as
the data (192 quarters). We show the standard deviations across these simulations in parentheses.
results remain unchanged.
4 Computation
4.1 Stochastic steady state
To compute the model’s equilibrium with two aggregate shocks, we use the approximate aggrega-
tion technique proposed by Krusell and Smith (1998).24 This technique assumes that households
act as if only a limited set of moments of the wealth distribution matters for predicting the future
of the economy, and that the aggregate result of their actions is consistent with their perceptions
of how the economy evolves. However, in contrast to Krusell and Smith (1998), we find that higher
moments of the wealth distribution are necessary in our model with progressive taxation. That
is, the accurate description of our economy’s evolution requires a combination of average physical
capital and the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution.
Furthermore, the optimization problem in our model requires households to know the endoge-
nous tax parameter, τ1. We therefore approximate the function Θ, as defined in equation (2.14),
with a parameterized function of the same moments that represent the wealth distribution.25 We
24The solution method for the stochastic steady state of the model with only aggregate productivity shocks is
the same, except that Gt = Gm, ∀t.
25This is in the same spirit as the bond price treatment in Krusell and Smith (1997).
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can now state the following functional forms for HΓ and Θ:
log(K ′) =a0(z,G) + a1(z,G)log(K) + a2(z,G)B + a3(z,G)(log(K))2 + a4(z,G)B2
+ a5(z,G)B
3 + a6(z,G)log(K)B + a7(z,G)Gini(a), (4.1)
Gini(a′) =a˜0(z,G) + a˜1(z,G)log(K) + a˜2(z,G)B + a˜3(z,G)(log(K))2 + a˜4(z,G)B2
+ a˜5(z,G)B
3 + a˜6(z,G)log(K)B + a˜7(z,G)Gini(a), (4.2)
τ1 =b0(z,G) + b1(z,G)log(K) + b2(z,G)B + b3(z,G)(log(K))
2 + b4(z,G)B
2
+ b5(z,G)B
3 + b6(z,G)log(K)B + b7(z,G)Gini(a), (4.3)
where K denotes the average physical capital, and Gini(a) denotes the Gini coefficient of the
wealth distribution.26 We compute the equilibrium using a fixed-point iteration procedure from
the parameters in equations (4.1)-(4.3) onto themselves; see Appendix B.1 for the details of the
computational algorithm and Appendix B.2 for the estimated equilibrium laws of motions.
A check of the one-step-ahead forecast accuracy yields R2s above 0.999993 for HΓ (equations
(4.1) and (4.2)), and above 0.99998 for Θ (equation (4.3)). However, as den Haan (2010) points
out, high R2-statistics are not necessarily indicative of multi-step-ahead forecast accuracy. Hence,
we also examine the 10-year ahead forecast errors of our model. This check shows that our forecast
errors are small and unbiased; see Appendix B.2 for the details.
4.2 Transition-path equilibrium
To study the welfare effects of eliminating fiscal volatility, we start with the ergodic distribution
of the two-shock equilibrium. From time t = 1, we let Gt follow its deterministic conditional
mean along the transition path until it converges to Gm. While we do not take a stance on
how this stabilization is brought about (Lucas, 1987 and Krusell et al., 2009), we do note that,
in contrast to stabilizing aggregate productivity shocks, the Gt-process is arguably under more
direct government control.
As stated, during the transition periods Gt follows a time-dependent deterministic conditional-
mean process until it converges to Gm, i.e.,
Gt = [1(G1 = Gl),1(G1 = Gm),1(G1 = Gh)] Π
t−1
GG′ [Gl, Gm, Gh]
T (4.4)
where ΠGG′ is the transition probability matrix of the G-process in the two-shock economy dis-
cussed in Appendix A. Note that, depending on G1, the Gt-paths will have different dynamics.
For example, if G1 = Gm, Gt will stay at Gm for all t ≥ 1, and the economy will immedi-
ately transition to its long-run G level. However, if the economy starts the transition away from
26These specific functional forms perform best among a large set of (relatively parsimonious) functional forms
tested.
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Gm, Gt converges to Gm over time through the deterministic process described in (4.4). In this
case, the counterfactual economy will go through transitional dynamics to eventually reach the
productivity-shock-only stochastic steady state.
Recall the assumption that the government purchases process is independent from other
stochastic processes, which implies that none of the other exogenous stochastic processes changes
during or after the elimination of the fiscal shocks. Therefore, our counterfactual economy features
aggregate productivity shocks both during and after the transition. This creates a new technical
challenge in addition to those present in previous transition path analyses of heterogeneous-agent
economies (e.g., Huggett, 1997 and Krusell and Smith, 1999). While these studies model a de-
terministic aggregate economy along the transition path, our stochastic setting with aggregate
uncertainty produces an exponentially higher number of possible aggregate paths as the tran-
sition period lengthens. This feature precludes computation of the equilibrium for all possible
realizations of aggregate shocks. To address this challenge, we extend the approximate aggrega-
tion technique to the transition-path setting: that is, we postulate that time-dependent prediction
functions govern the evolution of the economy on the transition path, through the following set
of laws of motions:
Γt+1 = H
trans
Γ,t
(
Γt, Bt, zt
)
, (4.5)
τ1,t = Θ
trans
t
(
Γt, Bt, zt
)
, (4.6)
where t denotes an arbitrary period along the transition path. At the end of the transition path,
the laws of motions converge to those in our one-shock equilibrium. Consequently, solving for the
transition-path equilibrium is equivalent to finding the appropriate approximations for (4.5) and
(4.6), such that the realized evolution of the economy is consistent with the postulated evolution;
see Appendix B.3 for the details of the algorithm. We find that the same functional forms we
use for the stochastic steady state economy yield accurate predictions also for the transition-path
equilibrium. That is, for every period on the transition path, we achieve a similar forecast accuracy
as in the stochastic steady state two-shock economy; see Appendix B.4 for the details.
5 Results
Following Lucas (1987), we measure the welfare costs of fiscal volatility as the proportional change
in a household’s life-time consumption (Consumption Equivalent Variation or λ), such that:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu((1 + λ)ct, Gt)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(c˜t, G˜t)], (5.1)
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where ct is consumption in the baseline economy with Gt-fluctuations, while c˜t is consumption in
the counterfactual economy with a deterministic G˜t-process.
5.1 Baseline results
To obtain our baseline results, we first calculate welfare gains conditional on wealth, employment
status and time preference for every sample economy in the transition-path computation,27 using
the value functions from our two-shock and transition-path equilibria.28 We then average these
across the sample economies, including all possible values of G1, the government purchases level
when fiscal volatility is eliminated. The results, presented in Table 5, can thus be interpreted as
the ex-ante expected welfare gains from eliminating fiscal volatility.
Table 5: Expected welfare gains λ (%)
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.0293 0.0289 0.0295 0.0296 0.0293 0.0290 0.0287 0.0313 0.0371
ε = 1 0.0293 0.0288 0.0294 0.0296 0.0293 0.0290 0.0287 0.0313 0.0371
ε = 0 0.0294 0.0291 0.0297 0.0297 0.0294 0.0291 0.0287 0.0312 0.0371
β˜ = β˜l 0.0277 0.0278 0.0277 0.0276 0.0275 0.0274 0.0268 0.0272 0.0314
β˜ = β˜m 0.0292 0.0300 0.0299 0.0296 0.0293 0.0290 0.0285 0.0302 0.0356
β˜ = β˜h 0.0360 0.0329 0.0327 0.0326 0.0326 0.0326 0.0336 0.0377 0.0440
Notes: The wealth groups are presented in ascending order from left to right. The welfare number for a particular
combination of ε (or β˜) and a wealth group is calculated as follows: we first draw a large set (16,000) of indepen-
dent joint distributions over (a, ε, β˜) from the simulation of the two-shock equilibrium. These distributions are
used to start the computation of the transition-path equilibria. For each sample economy, we then find all the in-
dividuals that fall into a particular wealth×employment status or wealth×preference category, and calculate their
welfare gain according to equation (5.1). We then take the average over the individuals in a particular category
to find the welfare numbers for a given sample economy. To arrive at the numbers in this table, we finally take
the average across all the 16,000 samples.
The results in Table 5 show that the aggregate welfare gain, i.e., the average welfare change
across the whole population, is about 0.03%, comparable in size to the results in Lucas (1987) and
Krusell et al. (2009). We further find that the welfare gains increase with wealth and patience
while employment status does not affect the welfare changes. In the next sub-section, we examine
the mechanisms affecting the welfare gains along the wealth dimension.
5.2 The mechanisms
Our analyses show that the increasing-with-wealth welfare gain pattern is the result of three
interacting channels: a direct utility channel, an income risk channel, and an average factor price
27To start the transition-path simulation, we draw a large set (16,000) of independent joint distributions over
(a, ε, β˜) from the simulation of the two-shock equilibrium; see Appendix B.3 for the details.
28The right side of (5.1) is the value function from the transition-path equilibrium. Given the log-log utility
assumption in the baseline calibration, the left side of (5.1) can be expressed using the value function from the
two-shock equilibrium and λ; see Appendix B.5 for the details of the derivation.
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channel. The direct utility channel isolates the utility gains resulting from household risk aversion
with respect to government purchases fluctuations. In the income risk channel, two types of fiscal
risk arising from tax rate fluctuations coexist: an after-tax-wage risk and an after-tax-rate-of-
return risk. These risks have different distributional effects through the precautionary saving
behavior of households and the risk exposure of households’ resources. Finally, the average factor
price channel reflects changes in average factor prices along the transition path.
In the following sub-sections, we discuss each channel in turn. We can exactly and quanti-
tatively separate the direct utility channel from the other two. Although an exact quantitative
separation of the income risk channel from the average factor price channel is not feasible as they
are intertwined in the economy, we can illustrate the distinct ways of how they work.
5.2.1 The direct utility channel
Since a household’s utility over G is strictly concave, eliminating fluctuations in G leads to a direct
increase in expected lifetime utility. To isolate this direct utility gain, we first compute a λc such
that:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu((1 + λc)ct, Gt)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(c˜t, Gt)], (5.2)
where ct, c˜t, and Gt are defined in the same way as before. Note that, λc is by definition insulated
from any utility change caused by direct changes in the G-process, since the stochastic G-process
now enters both sides of equation (5.2). Therefore, λc represents welfare changes that result solely
from changes in private consumption profiles. The difference between λ and λc thus characterizes
the direct utility channel.
Furthermore, with a separable flow utility function, λc can be computed using the following
simpler equation:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtlog((1 + λc)ct)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtlog(c˜t)]. (5.3)
The results, presented in Table 6, show positive, albeit smaller welfare changes when fiscal volatility
is eliminated (after the gain from the direct utility channel is subtracted). Thus, we conclude that
the direct utility channel is quantitatively important for the overall level of welfare changes, but,
distributionally, the other two channels are the ones that matter.
In addition to the direct utility channel, fluctuations in government purchases can contribute
to the welfare of households through affecting factor prices (pre-tax labor and capital income)
and individual income tax rates, both of which determine households’ after-tax income. The
government purchases process can directly change individual income tax rates due to the aggregate
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Table 6: Expected welfare gains from private consumption changes, λc (%)
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.0082 0.0081 0.0085 0.0085 0.0082 0.0079 0.0076 0.0101 0.0159
ε = 1 0.0082 0.0081 0.0085 0.0085 0.0082 0.0079 0.0076 0.0101 0.0159
ε = 0 0.0083 0.0083 0.0087 0.0086 0.0083 0.0080 0.0076 0.0101 0.0159
β˜ = β˜l 0.0072 0.0073 0.0073 0.0072 0.0071 0.0069 0.0064 0.0068 0.0110
β˜ = β˜m 0.0082 0.0089 0.0088 0.0085 0.0082 0.0079 0.0074 0.0091 0.0145
β˜ = β˜h 0.0142 0.0111 0.0109 0.0108 0.0108 0.0108 0.0118 0.0159 0.0222
Notes: The welfare numbers in this table are calculated as those in Table 5, using (5.3) instead of (5.1).
tax revenue rule. Indirectly, the government purchases process influences the amount of physical
capital (hence factor prices) in the economy, through changes in the split of aggregate wealth
between capital and government bonds (due to the effect of government spending on government
debt), and also through changes in the saving behavior of households facing changes in the tax
rate process.
In the following two subsections, we separately consider the volatility and the level effects on
households’ after-tax income from fluctuations in government purchases. We denote the volatility
effect as the income risk channel, and the level effect as the average factor price channel.
5.2.2 The income risk channel
Fluctuations in government purchases lead to more volatile after-tax income through both tax rates
and factor prices. The distributional welfare implications of eliminating this after-tax income risk
are, however, not straightforward. This is because the two components of after-tax income risk,
labor income risk and rate-of-return risk (or capital income risk), have opposite distributional
effects.
On the one hand, the effect of eliminating after-tax labor income uncertainty depends on
a household’s (heterogeneous) degree of self-insurance against labor income risks. As in other
Bewley-type incomplete market economies, our households engage in precautionary saving. Wealth-
ier households can better insure themselves against after-tax labor income risk. As a result,
wealth-poor households should benefit more from the elimination of this uncertainty. Hereafter,
we refer to this as the precautionary saving effect.
On the other hand, the tax-rate uncertainty induced by the G-shocks also creates a rate-of-
return risk on after-tax capital income. This rate-of-return risk makes households’ intertemporal
transfer of resources riskier. In our model with a realistic incomplete financial market, wealth-
rich households’ financial wealth, which is subject to the rate-of-return risk, accounts for a larger
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share of their expected life-time resources than is the case for the wealth-poor. Therefore, the
wealth-rich households have more exposure to the rate-of-return risk, and they should benefit
more from the elimination of fiscal volatility. Hereafter, we refer to this as the rate-of-return risk
effect. In Appendix C, we employ a partial equilibrium model, to build up the intuition further
and illustrate the distributional consequences of both the precautionary saving and rate-of-return
risk effects.
The precautionary saving and rate-of-return risk effects, in turn, have different effects on saving
behavior. The wealth-poor, whose saving is mainly driven by the precautionary saving motive,
have less incentives to save with a reduction in their after-tax labor income uncertainty, and hence
reduce their saving after the elimination of fiscal volatility. By contrast, the wealth-rich, for whom
the rate-of-return risk is the more important factor in their saving decision, may increase their
saving. Figure 1 confirms this conjecture showing that agents reduce their saving in the first period
of the transition-path equilibrium compared to the two-shock equilibrium until approximately the
90th wealth percentile, whereas above this threshold, the wealth-rich increase their saving after
the elimination of fiscal volatility.29
Figure 1: Policy function comparison - saving
Notes: This figure shows the difference between the first-period policy function for saving from the transition
equilibrium (with G1 = Gm) and that from the two-shock equilibrium (with G1 = Gm), evaluated at z = zg , ε = 1,
β˜ = β˜m, and the long-run averages of (K,B,Gini) conditional on G1 = Gm and z = zg .
In short, the income risk channel is an amalgam of the aforementioned two competing effects.
29The policy function difference for saving is evaluated at G1 = Gm, z = zg , ε = 1, β˜ = β˜m, and the long-run
averages of (K,B,Gini) conditional on G1 = Gm and z = zg . However, similar patterns hold for other combinations
of state variables. The comparison also looks similar when the policy functions from other periods on the transition
path are used.
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As will be made clear in Section 6.1, through alternative counterfactual tax adjustment mecha-
nisms, the distributional effects from this channel depend on how the tax rate volatility burden
is distributed in a given tax system. Note that when τ1 is adjusted to satisfy the aggregate tax
revenue rule as in the baseline case, the wealth-rich face significant uncertainty in after-tax re-
turns from their savings, because τ1 determines the top marginal tax rates, which renders the
rate-of-return risk effect strong in the baseline case. The rate-of-return risk effect, accompanied
by an average factor price effect that initially also favors the wealth-rich, as we will show in the
next subsection, results in the increasing-with-wealth welfare gain pattern in Table 6.
5.2.3 The average factor price channel
We next examine the average factor price channel. In our model with a representative neoclassical
firm, factor price changes follow aggregate capital stock changes. If the aggregate capital stock
drops after the elimination of fiscal volatility, then pre-tax capital returns, all else equal, will
increase relative to wages. Because wealth-rich (wealth-poor) households have higher (lower)
capital income shares, the wealth-rich (wealth-poor) households will benefit (lose) from this relative
factor price change. As a result, changes in the aggregate capital stock will have distributional
effects.
To examine the direction of the average factor price channel for our baseline scenario, we
compute the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capital path in the transition-
path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium. The results in Figure 2 show that the expected
aggregate capital path in the transition-path equilibrium falls at first slightly below, then returns
to, and finally goes above of that in the two-shock equilibrium.
The differential saving adjustment in the cross section after the elimination of fiscal volatility
examined in Figure 1 explains the aggregate capital adjustment pattern in Figure 2. In particular,
in response to the elimination of fiscal volatility, the majority wealth-poor households decrease
their saving while the wealth-rich households increase their saving. What is more, simulation
results show that the pace of saving adjustments is faster for the poor. Therefore, aggregate
capital drops at first and gradually increases.
To further illustrate the average factor price channel, we examine the welfare gains from elim-
inating fiscal volatility conditional on G1, government purchases at the time the policy change
is instituted. The results in Table 7 reveal similar overall increasing-with-wealth welfare gain
patterns. However, the slope of the welfare gains are steeper (flatter) when G1 = Gh (G1 = Gl),
compared to that from the case with G1 = Gm. We trace the causes of those differences to the
24
Figure 2: Expected aggregate capital path comparison
Notes: This figure shows the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capital path in the transition-
path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium. We use the same 16,000 sample economies and the same sequences
of z-shocks (for both the transition and the two-shock aggregate capital paths) as in the transition-path computation
and then take the average. The G-shock sequences in the two-shock simulations are constructed in such a way that
the cross-sectional joint distribution of (z,G)-shocks in each period is close to the invariant joint distribution.
Table 7: Expected welfare gains from private consumption, λc (%), conditional on G1
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
G1 = Gl
All 0.0135 0.0141 0.0144 0.0142 0.0138 0.0133 0.0124 0.0130 0.0179
ε = 1 0.0135 0.0141 0.0144 0.0142 0.0138 0.0133 0.0124 0.0130 0.0179
ε = 0 0.0137 0.0143 0.0146 0.0144 0.0139 0.0134 0.0124 0.0130 0.0178
β˜ = β˜l 0.0131 0.0134 0.0133 0.0131 0.0128 0.0125 0.0111 0.0096 0.0126
β˜ = β˜m 0.0134 0.0149 0.0147 0.0142 0.0138 0.0133 0.0122 0.0120 0.0163
β˜ = β˜h 0.0185 0.0176 0.0172 0.0169 0.0167 0.0166 0.0166 0.0194 0.0248
G1 = Gm
All 0.0085 0.0084 0.0088 0.0088 0.0085 0.0082 0.0078 0.0102 0.0160
ε = 1 0.0085 0.0084 0.0088 0.0088 0.0085 0.0082 0.0078 0.0102 0.0160
ε = 0 0.0086 0.0085 0.0089 0.0089 0.0086 0.0083 0.0078 0.0102 0.0160
β˜ = β˜l 0.0075 0.0076 0.0076 0.0075 0.0073 0.0072 0.0066 0.0070 0.0111
β˜ = β˜m 0.0084 0.0092 0.0091 0.0088 0.0085 0.0082 0.0076 0.0093 0.0146
β˜ = β˜h 0.0143 0.0112 0.0111 0.0110 0.0110 0.0110 0.0119 0.0160 0.0223
G1 = Gh
All 0.0025 0.0015 0.0020 0.0023 0.0022 0.0021 0.0023 0.0068 0.0137
ε = 1 0.0025 0.0015 0.0020 0.0023 0.0022 0.0021 0.0023 0.0068 0.0137
ε = 0 0.0025 0.0017 0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 0.0021 0.0023 0.0068 0.0137
β˜ = β˜l 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0012 0.0036 0.0091
β˜ = β˜m 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0023 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021 0.0059 0.0124
β˜ = β˜h 0.0097 0.0042 0.0043 0.0044 0.0045 0.0047 0.0066 0.0123 0.0195
Notes: The welfare numbers in this table are calculated as in Table 6, but separately for G1 = Gl, Gm, Gh,
using 8,000 simulations for G1 = Gm and 4,000 simulations each for G1 = Gl, Gh.
average factor price channel.30 Figure 3 plots the percentage difference between the expected ag-
30The reduction in the volatility of the after-tax income is similar across different G1 values.
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Figure 3: Expected aggregate capital path comparison, conditional on G1
Notes: This figure shows the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capital path in the transition-
path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium conditional on G1. We use the same 16,000 sample economies
and the same sequences of z-shocks (for both the transition and the two-shock aggregate capital paths) as in the
transition-path computation and then average by G1: 8,000 simulations for G1 = Gm, and 4,000 simulations each
for G1 = Gl, Gh. Note that, due to our conditioning on G1 and the subsequent smaller sample sizes, the expected
aggregate capital paths in Figure 3 are more volatile compared to those in Figure 2.
gregate capital path in the transition-path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium, conditional
on G1. The differences in capital path adjustment are consistent with the welfare patterns across
different G1 cases. For G1 = Gh, the aggregate capital declines more after the elimination of fiscal
volatility, benefiting the wealth-rich more (compared to the case with G1 = Gm). By contrast, for
G1 = Gl, the reduction in the aggregate capital occurs for a much shorter period of time, which
benefits the wealth-poor more (compared to the case with G1 = Gm).
In sum, in our baseline setup, the elimination of fiscal volatility favors the wealthy distribu-
tionally, because the rate-of-return risk effect as part of the income risk channel, and, at least
initially, the average factor price effect favor the wealth-rich.
6 Alternative specifications and additional experiments
In this section, we examine the welfare and distributional consequences of eliminating fiscal volatil-
ity under the following alternative model specifications: different adjustments to the progressive
tax function, other fiscal regimes, different flow utility functions, and alternative TFP and labor
income processes. In addition, we examine our results when we double fiscal volatility, as well as
when the elimination of fiscal volatility is accompanied by a sudden change in the level of govern-
ment purchases. In each case, we re-calibrate parameter values when necessary to preserve target
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moment-data consistency. We summarize the welfare change results in terms of λc in Table 8.
Table 18 in Appendix D.1 reports the corresponding λ-measures.
6.1 Alternative specifications
Tax function adjustments. Recall that, in our baseline specification, the top marginal rate of
the progressive income tax (τ1) is determined endogenously to satisfy the government’s tax revenue
response rule (equation 2.6), while the linear tax rate (τ0) and the tax function parameters τ2 and
τ3 in the progressive tax function are fixed. Although we have argued that a fluctuating τ1 can
best represent the cyclicality of the progressivity of the U.S. tax system, here we consider the
following three alternative adjustments in the tax function: adjusting τ0, the linear part in the
income tax function, and adjusting τ2 and τ3, the tax parameters that govern the progressivity of
the tax system.
Table 8: Expected welfare gains from private consumption, λc (%), under different cases
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
Baseline 0.0082 0.0081 0.0085 0.0085 0.0082 0.0079 0.0076 0.0101 0.0159
Different Tax Function Adjustment
Adjusting τ0 0.0084 0.0083 0.0086 0.0087 0.0084 0.0082 0.0077 0.0091 0.0135
Adjusting τ2 0.0088 0.0093 0.0095 0.0095 0.0093 0.0091 0.0080 0.0051 0.0065
Adjusting τ3 0.0087 0.0095 0.0097 0.0096 0.0093 0.0090 0.0078 0.0028 0.0030
Other Fiscal Regimes
Balanced Budget 0.0112 0.0109 0.0109 0.0108 0.0107 0.0107 0.0110 0.0159 0.0242
Linear Tax 0.0072 0.0067 0.0068 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070 0.0071 0.0103 0.0163
Lump-sum Tax 0.0073 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070 0.0069 0.0068 0.0071 0.0129 0.0204
Non-separable Utility Function
Substitute 0.0008 0.0015 0.0028 0.0028 0.0003 0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0019 0.0014
Complement 0.0278 0.0258 0.0281 0.0284 0.0236 0.0305 0.0285 0.0322 0.0294
Alternative TFP and labor income processes
Constant TFP 0.0089 0.0084 0.0089 0.0090 0.0087 0.0085 0.0084 0.0119 0.0191
Richer Income Process 0.0054 0.0058 0.0059 0.0059 0.0057 0.0052 0.0046 0.0050 0.0107
Additional Experiments
Double Volatility -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0074 -0.0073 -0.0070 -0.0067 -0.0063 -0.0089 -0.0148
Sudden Change 0.0108 0.0125 0.0123 0.0118 0.0111 0.0104 0.0092 0.0100 0.0158
The average and distributional welfare results from the case with τ0-adjustment turn out to
be quite similar to those from the baseline (row 2 of Table 8). To understand this outcome, we
first note that the distributional implications are pretty similar when either τ0 and τ1 is adjusted.
To be more precise, in the first case, all households face the same tax rate changes in terms of
absolute magnitude; while in relative terms, the tax rate change is decreasing with income levels.
In the second case, all households face the same percentage change in their tax rates; while in
terms of absolute magnitude, the tax rate change is increasing with income levels. Regardless
of the specific differences, the wealth-rich households, whose marginal tax rates are close to the
upper bound τ0 + τ1, face a similar rate-of-return risk in both cases. The analogues of Figures
1 and 2 look essentially the same for the τ0-adjustment case (see Figure 4), which confirms our
intuition.
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Figure 4: Comparing various tax adjustment cases with the baseline
(A) Expected aggregate capital path comparison (B) Policy function comparison - saving
Notes: Panel (A) compares the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capital path in the transition-
path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium in the baseline scenario with those from the τ0-, τ2-, and τ3-
adjustment cases. The calculation of each case is done in exactly the same manner as that of Figure 2. Panel (B)
compares the difference between the first-period policy function for saving from the transition equilibrium and that
from the two-shock equilibrium in the baseline scenario with those from the τ0-, τ2-, and τ3-adjustment cases. The
calculation of each case is done in exactly the same manner as that of Figure 1. The wealth percentiles in Panel
(B) are from the baseline model (they are, however, very similar across different tax adjustment specifications).
The results in row 3 and 4 of Table 8 show that adjustment through τ2 or τ3 yields similar
overall welfare gains as in the baseline case. However, unlike in the baseline scenario, the welfare
gain for the top 5% of households is smaller than the average welfare gain in both cases. First
note that the average factor price channel cannot explain the lower welfare gain for the wealthy.
In each of the two cases, the expected aggregate capital stock decreases (more than in the baseline
case) after the elimination of fiscal volatility (see Panel A in Figure 4), which leads to lower wages
and a higher pre-tax capital rate-of-return, favoring the wealth-rich households. The difference is
rather due to the fact that in these cases the rate-of-return risk effect plays a limited role for the
wealth-rich households. A fluctuating τ2 or τ3 does not generate substantial tax-rate uncertainty
for the very rich households as their marginal tax rate is close to the upper bound, a (constant)
τ0 + τ1. By contrast, it is the tax rates for the middle of the income distribution that respond the
most to changes in τ2 and τ3. Therefore the wealth-rich households do not benefit much from the
fiscal volatility reduction in these cases.
Panel (B) in Figure 4 compares the changes in saving behavior for the τ2-adjustment and the τ3-
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adjustment cases with those of the baseline case. In both the τ2-adjustment and the τ3-adjustment
cases, more households decrease their savings compared to the baseline case, which is consistent
with the aggregate capital adjustment path comparisons in Panel (A). In particular, there is little
(no) saving increase from the wealth-rich households in the τ2-adjustment case (τ3-adjustment
case), which confirms that the rate-of-return effect is rather limited.
The different welfare gain patterns in the baseline scenario vis-a`-vis the τ2- and τ3-adjustment
scenarios have important policy implications: the distributional effects of eliminating fiscal volatil-
ity depend on which wealth group experiences the tax volatility burden that is caused by govern-
ment purchases shocks. In the U.S. this group appears to be the wealth-rich.
The comparison between the baseline case and the τ2- and τ3-adjustment cases also allows
us to gauge the quantitative importance of the income risk channel. The average factor price
change in the baseline case is more favorable to the wealth-poor than those in the τ2- and τ3-
adjustment cases. Nonetheless, the welfare gain is increasing across wealth in the baseline case
while it is decreasing in the latter cases. Therefore, it appears that the income risk channel is
the main driver behind the opposite distributional effects of the baseline case vis-a`-vis the τ2- and
τ3-adjustment cases.
Other fiscal regimes. We next present distributional welfare results under three additional
fiscal regimes. These analyses will shed additional light on the mechanisms behind the welfare
effects of the elimination of fiscal volatility. In our first regime, a balanced budget scenario, we
dispense with the tax revenue response rule (equation (2.6)) and assume that government spending
is financed exclusively through tax revenue. In our next two regimes, a linear (lump-sum) tax
scenario, we keep the tax revenue response rule but change the progressive tax system to a linear
(lump-sum) tax, by setting τ1 = 0 (τ0 = 0 and τ2 = −1). The linear tax rate (the lump-sum tax
amount) are then endogenously determined to satisfy the aggregate tax revenue response rule.
We present the results of this set of analyses in rows 5 to 7 of Table 8. In the balanced
budget regime, the welfare gain is larger than in the baseline case across the wealth distribution,
even though the distributional effects are similar. This implies that allowing the government to
borrow helps to smooth out tax revenue changes (and tax rate fluctuations) caused by government
spending shocks, which in turn reduces the welfare cost of fiscal volatility.
Turning next to the linear tax case, we find that the welfare gains are very similar to those
in the baseline τ1-adjustment case, both in terms of magnitude and pattern, as shown in row
6 of Table 8. Indeed, the mechanisms work in a similar way: in a linear tax regime, cyclical
adjustments in tax rates cause after-tax rate-of-return uncertainty, especially for the wealth-rich.
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Consequently, the elimination of this uncertainty benefits them. Indeed, when we compare the
saving policy function between the two-shock and the transition-path equilibrium, we find an
almost identical pattern as that in the baseline case (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Analysis of the linear tax case
(A) Expected aggregate capital path comparison (B) Policy function comparison - saving
Notes: Panel (A) shows the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capital path in the transition-
path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium in the linear tax case. The calculation is done in exactly the same
manner as that of Figure 2. Panel (B) shows the difference between the first-period policy function for saving from
the transition equilibrium and that from the two-shock equilibrium in the linear tax case. The calculation of each
case is done in exactly the same manner as that of Figure 1. The wealth percentiles in Panel (B) are from the
linear tax model, calculated in the same way as those in Figure 1.
Finally, our results for the lump-sum tax case (row 7 of Table 8) show that the welfare gains
from eliminating fiscal volatility are again increasing in wealth, even more so than in the baseline
case.31 Indeed, Panel (A) of Figure 6 shows that the expected aggregate capital stock in the
lump-sum tax case decreases for almost 300 periods after the elimination of volatility and thus
longer (and initially steeper with a shallower rebound) than in the baseline case, which implies
that the average factor price channel favors the wealth-rich very strongly here. Overall, since
there is no distortion when taxes are lump-sum, the average factor price channel is particularly
powerful here (and without a direct impact on after-tax capital returns and wages in this case we
also have a less powerful income risk channel): the higher return makes capital more attractive
as a saving vehicle after the elimination of volatility (see Panel B of Figure 6), leading to benefits
for the wealth-rich.
31We note that the lump-sum tax is imposed only on employed households to avoid negative after-tax incomes.
This treatment is slightly different from all the other cases, where tax payments are zero if and only if y ≤ 0. With
lump sum taxes, this could potentially introduce a discontinuity in the budget constraint of the unemployed at
y = 0 (for the employed, it must hold that y − T ≥ 0 at the borrowing limit, and thus, a fortiori, for all employed
households).
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Figure 6: Analysis of the lump-sum tax case
(A) Expected aggregate capital path comparison (B) Policy function comparison - saving
Notes: Panel (A) shows the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capital path in the transition-
path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium in the lump-sum tax case. The calculation is done in exactly the
same manner as that of Figure 2. Panel (B) shows the difference between the first-period policy function for saving
from the transition equilibrium and that from the two-shock equilibrium in the lump-sum tax case. The calculation
of each case is done in exactly the same manner as that of Figure 1. The wealth percentiles in Panel (B) are from
the lump sum tax model, calculated in the same way as those in Figure 1.
Non-separable utility. Recall that our baseline specification assumes a separable flow utility
function in private and public consumption (ρ = 1), which implies that government purchases
volatility affects the household decisions only indirectly, through equilibrium tax rate changes.
By contrast, if public and private consumption are non-separable, then this volatility has a di-
rect effect on the consumption-saving decision, since the government purchases level affects the
marginal utility of private consumption.32 We thus examine two alternative specifications where
public consumption is an Edgeworth substitute (complement), ρ = 0.5 (ρ = 1.5), to private
consumption.33
The results in rows 8 and 9 of Table 8 show that when G and c are complements (substi-
tutes), the welfare gains from the elimination of fiscal volatility are larger (smaller) than in the
baseline scenario. This is because the positive conditional comovement between G and taxes in
the estimated tax revenue response rule makes volatility in G more costly when c and G are
complements.34 Since households face higher tax rates (lower disposable income) when G and the
marginal utility of private consumption are high, the utility gain from fiscal volatility elimination
32See Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) for an overview of utility specifications for public consumption.
33To calculate λc with a non-separable utility function, we calculate the left-hand side of (5.2) as a discounted
sum of flow utilities under various values of λc, using the equilibrium policy functions. We then find a value of λc
that satisfies the equation numerically, using a bisection search.
34In the estimated aggregate tax revenue response rule, the tax-output ratio responds to the government-
purchases-output ratio with a coefficient of ρT,G = 0.484; see Appendix A.2. for the details.
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in the case of complements is larger than in the separable case. An analogous argument applies
when G and c are substitutes.
Alternative TFP and labor income processes. Recall that our baseline scenario adopts
the same TFP and unemployment processes as used in Krusell and Smith (1998). However,
these choices produce an output volatility in the model that is 70% larger than that in the data
(Section 3.3). To examine whether this difference affects our welfare results, we match the output
volatility in the data by keeping TFP constant (at z = 1), but allowing unemployment rate
fluctuations. The results in row 10 in Table 8 are very similar to those from the baseline model,
suggesting that the excess output volatility in our model does not influence our welfare results.
Our baseline specification, to ease the computational burden, also does not allow for any labor
income heterogeneity conditional on being employed. However, a realistically richer income process
might matter for our welfare results. It can affect the implications of the progressive tax system
as well as the degree of precautionary saving motive. Moreover, it provides an additional channel
through which wealth inequality is generated in the model (Krueger et al., 2016). To examine
whether this feature affects our welfare results, we introduce individual-specific productivity shocks
as in McKay and Reis (2016). The idiosyncratic productivity process is assumed to be independent
from any other processes and determines the labor earnings for employed households.35 The
welfare numbers in row 11 of Table 8 indicate that the richer labor income dynamics does not
change the main message of the baseline model. The average welfare change is slightly smaller
than that in the baseline case, but the wealth-rich still benefit more from the fiscal volatility
elimination.
6.2 Additional experiments
Transition to a higher level of fiscal volatility. As mentioned, one topic that has received
some debate is how permanently heightened fiscal policy volatility might impact aggregate eco-
nomic activity and welfare. To address this question, we let the economy transit to a level of
fiscal volatility which has twice the variance of government purchases than that in our baseline
economy.36 Appendix D.1 provides the details of the computational implementation of this ex-
periment.
The penultimate row in Table 8 shows the welfare changes from this magnified volatility exper-
iment. As in the baseline experiment, higher fiscal volatility leads to a welfare loss for every wealth
35In particular, building on McKay and Reis (2016), we calibrate the idiosyncratic productivity process to follow
the following discretized Markov chain: grids take values from [0.49, 0.90, 1.61], a transition can only happen
between adjacent grids, and it happens with a probability of 0.02.
36To put this exercise into historical context, had we started our data sample in 1950I instead of 1960I to include
the Korean War period when estimating the government purchases process, its variance would be about 1.5 times
larger than that used in the baseline model.
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group, with wealth-rich households experiencing a larger loss. Overall, the numbers suggest that,
at least for the range between zero and twice the pre-crisis level of fiscal volatility, the welfare
effects of fiscal volatility are roughly symmetric.
Sudden change in the level of government purchases. In this experiment, we examine
the consequences of a concomitant sudden change in the government purchases level by letting
government purchases move to and stay at their unconditional mean value, Gm, immediately after
the elimination of fiscal volatility. We view this and the baseline scenario, where government
purchases gradually converge to their long-run level, as two extreme ways of how fiscal volatility
can be eliminated.
Table 9: Conditional expected welfare gains from private consumption, λc (%), sudden change
G1 = Gl Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All -0.3749 -0.5121 -0.4826 -0.4469 -0.4198 -0.3922 -0.3030 0.0078 0.2184
ε = 1 -0.3748 -0.5134 -0.4833 -0.4471 -0.4200 -0.3924 -0.3036 0.0074 0.2182
ε = 0 -0.3762 -0.5054 -0.4764 -0.4455 -0.4179 -0.3897 -0.2952 0.0132 0.2212
β˜ = β˜l -0.4978 -0.5347 -0.5213 -0.4932 -0.4636 -0.4369 -0.3232 -0.0537 0.1555
β˜ = β˜m -0.3786 -0.4904 -0.4732 -0.4465 -0.4198 -0.3924 -0.3090 -0.0032 0.2056
β˜ = β˜h -0.0521 -0.4158 -0.3934 -0.3644 -0.3380 -0.3097 -0.1665 0.0754 0.2759
G1 = Gh Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.4010 0.5452 0.5142 0.4767 0.4472 0.4174 0.3243 0.0119 -0.1873
ε = 1 0.4008 0.5463 0.5149 0.4768 0.4474 0.4176 0.3249 0.0123 -0.1870
ε = 0 0.4026 0.5389 0.5088 0.4756 0.4455 0.4151 0.3166 0.0064 -0.1904
β˜ = β˜l 0.5268 0.5653 0.5513 0.5209 0.4893 0.4610 0.3417 0.0673 -0.1356
β˜ = β˜m 0.4045 0.5244 0.5055 0.4763 0.4472 0.4176 0.3300 0.0210 -0.1772
β˜ = β˜h 0.0825 0.4525 0.4280 0.3968 0.3689 0.3393 0.1938 -0.0442 -0.2321
From the results in the last row of Table 8, we see that the unconditional welfare gains with a
sudden change in the level of government purchases are very similar to those in the baseline case.
However, the results in Table 9 show that the welfare changes conditional on G1 = Gl and G1 = Gh
are one order of magnitude larger than those in the baseline case (Table 7). For the G1 = Gl-case,
the welfare changes are increasing in the wealth level, while the opposite pattern holds for the
case of G1 = Gh. However, these patterns are not driven by the elimination of fiscal volatility per
se. The sudden change in the level of government purchases (and hence taxation) leads to a faster
aggregate capital stock adjustment and a larger effect on welfare. For instance in the G1 = Gl-
case, the sudden increase in government purchases leads to a faster decrease in aggregate capital,
output, and average welfare. However, since lower aggregate capital levels (higher pre-tax rates
of return) favor the wealth-rich capital income earners, the welfare change pattern increases with
wealth. Following a similar intuition, the distributional effect for the G1 = Gh-case is reversed.
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7 Conclusion
The recent recession, the economy’s slow recovery, and political turmoil have sparked a debate
over the economic effects of fiscal volatility and uncertainty. In this study, we quantify the welfare
effects of fiscal volatility and their distribution in a neoclassical stochastic growth environment
with incomplete markets. In our model, aggregate uncertainty arises from both productivity and
government purchases shocks. Government spending is financed by a progressive tax system,
modeled to match important features of the U.S. tax system. We calibrate the model to U.S. data
and evaluate the welfare and distributional consequences of eliminating government purchases
shocks.
Our baseline results show that the welfare costs of fiscal volatility are fairly small on average.
However, distributionally, the welfare costs are increasing in wealth. This distributional implica-
tion follows because the cyclicality of the overall progressivity of the U.S. tax system implies a
strong role for top marginal tax rates in the cyclical adjustment of the tax system to satisfy the
government budget constraint.
While our study provides insight into the impact of eliminating fiscal volatility, it should be
viewed as a first step towards a more comprehensive analysis of the welfare and distributional
implications of fiscal volatility. Future research could explore how our results change if nominal
frictions that cause relative price distortions are added to the model. There is also no role in
our model for a direct influence of government purchases on the unemployment process and thus
cyclical idiosyncratic risk. Including this feature in a future quantitative analysis would require
the development of a statistical model of how government purchases influence idiosyncratic un-
employment processes, but such a model is elusive in the literature. Instead, since government
purchases appear to be independent of the cycle in U.S. post-war quarterly frequency data, we
have also used this assumption in the model. Furthermore, we have chosen to place exogenous
volatility fundamentally on the level of government purchases, while the volatility of individual
tax rates is derived from our model. Among fiscal data, we view the official aggregate data on
government purchases as cleanest and least subject to construction choices, but recognize that the
data on tax rates collected in Mertens and Montiel Olea (2013) could provide an alternative route.
Finally, we model government purchases as a symmetric autoregressive process. However, future
research could examine fiscal uncertainty in an economy facing the risk of very large government
purchases as a very rare and dramatic event.
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A Appendix: Estimation of the fiscal parameters
For the calibration, we use quarterly data from 1960I to 2007IV.
A.1 Government purchases process
We first construct a real government purchases (G) series by deflating the “Government consump-
tion expenditures and gross investment” series (from NIPA table 3.9.5, line 1) with the GDP
deflator (from NIPA table 1.1.9, line 1). We then estimate an AR(1) process for the linearly de-
trended real log(G) series. The estimated AR(1) coefficient is 0.9603 and the standard deviation
of the innovation term is 0.0096. We use the Rouwenhorst method (see Rouwenhorst (1995)) to
approximate this zero-mean AR(1) process with a three-state Markov Chain. This gives us a
transition probability matrix, and a grid in the form (−m,0,m), where m represents the percent-
age deviation from the middle grid point. The middle grid point of the G-process, Gm, is then
calibrated to match the time series average of nominal G over nominal GDP from U.S. national
accounting data (nominal GDP is from NIPA table 1.1.5, line 1), 20.86%. The grid for G is given
by (Gl, Gm, Gh), where Gh = (1 +m)Gm and Gl = (1−m)Gm, and the discretized G-process on
[0.2205, 0.2319, 0.2433] has the following transition matrix:

0.9607 0.0389 0.0004
0.0195 0.9611 0.0195
0.0004 0.0389 0.9607 .

A.2 Fiscal rule
A.2.1 Methodology and estimation results
We first estimate the fiscal rule separately at two levels of government: the federal government
level and the state/local level, allowing for debt only at the federal level.37 We then construct a
composite rule, using the share of federal government purchases in total government purchases.
The empirical specification for the federal fiscal rule is based on Bohn (1998) and Davig and
Leeper (2011) and takes the following form:
TFt − TrFt
Yt
= ρFT,0 + ρ
F
T,B
Bt
Yt
+ ρFT,Y log(
Yt
Y¯t
) + ρFT,G
GFt
Yt
, (A.1)
where:
Yt: Nominal GDP (Line 1 of NIPA table 1.1.5).
37When we estimate one equation, using the sum of federal and the state-local level data, the estimation result
implies a non-stationary government debt process.
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TFt − TrFt : Federal government current receipts (Line 1 of NIPA table 3.2) minus federal
government transfer expenditure (Line 25 of NIPA table 3.2).
Bt: Market value of privately held gross federal debt at the beginning of a quarter: data are
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (http://www.dallasfed.org/research/econdata/
govdebt.cfm).
Y¯t: Nominal CBO potential GDP: data are from the CBO website (http://www.cbo.gov/
publication/42912).
GFt : Nominal federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment (Line 23 of
NIPA table 1.1.5).
At the state and local level, we drop the debt-to-GDP ratio term, yielding the following
equation for the state and local level:
TSLt − TrSLt
Yt
= ρSLT,0 + ρ
SL
T,Y log(
Yt
Y¯t
) + ρSLT,G
GSLt
Yt
, (A.2)
where:
TSLt − TrSLt : State and local government receipts (Line 1 of NIPA table 3.3) minus state and
local government transfer expenditure (Line 24 of NIPA table 3.3).
GSLt : Nominal state and local government consumption expenditures and gross investment
(Line 26 of NIPA table 1.1.5).
We then linearly detrend all ratio variables, except for log(Yt/Y¯t), before estimating equations
(A.1) and (A.2).
Table 10 summarizes the estimation results.
Table 10: Estimated coefficients of the fiscal rule
constant Bt/Yt log(Yt/Y¯t) Gt/Yt
Federal -0.009 0.017 0.321 0.146
(0.001) (0.004) (0.032) (0.096)
State and local 0.001 – -0.039 0.771
(0.001) – (0.015) (0.063)
A.2.2 The composite fiscal rule
The composite fiscal rule used in our model is given by:
Tt − Trt
Yt
= ρT,0 + ρT,B
Bt
Yt
+ ρT,Y log(
Yt
Y¯t
) + ρT,G
Gt
Yt
= ρT,0 + ρ
F
T,B
Bt
Yt
+ (ρFT,Y + ρ
SL
T,Y )log(
Yt
Y¯t
) + (γF ρFT,G + (1− γF )ρSLT,G)
Gt
Yt
, (A.3)
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where γF is calibrated as the average share of federal government purchases within total govern-
ment purchases: 0.46. This yields the following fiscal rule parameters:
ρT,B = 0.017, ρT,Y = 0.282, ρT,G = 0.484.
We use ρT,0 to match the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the data: 30%.
A.3 Consumption and income tax parameters
For the consumption tax function and the linear part of the income tax function, we use the
average tax rate calculated from the data.
To be specific, the average tax rate on consumption is defined as:
τc =
TPI − PRT
PCE − (TPI − PRT ) , (A.4)
where the numerator is taxes on production and imports (TPI, NIPA table 3.1, line 4) minus state
and local property taxes (PRT, NIPA table 3.3, line 8). The denominator is personal consumption
expenditures (PCE, NIPA table 1.1.5, line 2) net of the numerator. We calculate the average τc,t
over our sample period as our τc parameter: 8.14%.
For income taxes, we use the state level tax revenue to approximate the linear part:
τ0 =
PIT + CT + PRT
Taxable Income
, (A.5)
where PIT (NIPA table 3.3, line 4) is state income tax, CT (NIPA table 3.3, line 10) is state tax
on corporate income, and PRT (NIPA table 3.3, line 8) is state property taxes. Note that we
exclude the social insurance contribution in the numerator since we do not have social security
expenditures in the model. The denominator is GDP minus consumption of fixed capital (NIPA
table 1.7.5, line 6), since our model has a depreciation allowance for capital income. Averaging
τ0,t from 1960I to 2007IV yields τ0 = 5.25%.
B Appendix: Computational algorithm
B.1 Computational algorithm for the two-shock stochastic steady state
Step 0: We first select a set of summary statistics for the wealth distribution, {K,Gini(a)}, and fix
the functional form of the equilibrium rules in equations (4.1)-(4.3). We then set the interpolation
grids for (a,K,Gini(a), B) to be used in the approximation of the household’s continuation value
function and policy function. We use an initial guess of coefficients {a00, . . . , a07}, {a˜00, . . . , a˜07},
{b00, . . . , b07} to obtain initial conjectures for {H0Γ,Θ0}, and set up a convergence criterion ε = 10−4.
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Step 1: At the nth iteration, imposing {HnΓ ,Θn} in the household optimization problem, we
use a value function iteration to solve the household’s parametric dynamic programming prob-
lem as defined in Section 2.4. From this process, we obtain the continuation value function
V n(a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z,G;HnΓ ,Θ
n).
Step 2: We next simulate the economy using NH households and T periods. In each period t
of the simulation, we first calculate the equilibrium τeq,n1,t using equation (2.11) and {HnΓ}. Then
we solve the household’s optimization problem for the current (Knt , Gini
n
t (a), B
n
t , z
n
t , G
n
t , τ
eq,n
1,t )
using V n(a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z,G;HnΓ ,Θ
n) as the continuation value function and {HnΓ , HB}.
This is a one-shot optimization problem. The aggregate states in the next period follow from
our aggregation of the optimal household decisions. From this step, we collect the time series
{Knt , Ginint (a), Bnt , znt , Gnt , τeq,n1,t }Tt=1.
Step 3: With these time series, we obtain separate OLS estimates of {aˆn0 , . . . , aˆn7}, {ˆ˜an0 , . . . , ˆ˜an7},
{bˆn0 , . . . , bˆn7}, for each z and G combination, which, with a slight abuse of notation, we summarize
as (HˆnΓ , Θˆ
n).
Step 4: If |HnΓ − HˆnΓ | <  and |Θn − Θˆn| < , we stop. Otherwise, we set
Hn+1Γ = αH × HˆnΓ + (1− αH)×HnΓ
Θn+1 = αΘ × Θˆn + (1− αΘ)×Θn
with αH , αΘ ∈ (0, 1], and go to Step 1.
Step 5: Finally, we check whether the R2s (the multiple-step-ahead forecast errors) of the final
OLS regressions are sufficiently high (small) for the equilibrium rules to be well approximated. If
they are not, we change the functional forms in Step 0 and repeat the algorithm.
In Step 1, we iterate on the value function until it converges at a set of collocation points, chosen
to be the grid points of (a,K,Gini(a), B) defined in Step 0. In each step of the value function
iteration, we use multi-dimensional cubic splines on this interpolation grid to approximate the
continuation value function. For each collocation point of the state variables (a,K,Gini(a), B) as
well as the exogenous aggregate state variables (z,G), we use {HnΓ ,Θn, HB} to infer the values
of (K ′, Gini′(a), B′, τ1). Given the aggregate variables (K ′, Gini′(a), B′, τ1), we maximize the
Bellman equation numerically along the a′-dimension using Brent’s method, as described in Press
et al. (2007). The same method is used in the numerical optimization part of Step 2.
In Step 2, we use NH = 90, 000 households and run 12 parallel simulations of length T = 18, 000
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each.38 Following Krusell and Smith (1998), we also enforce that at each t these 90,000 households
are distributed according to the stationary distribution of the Markov chains governing ε and β.
We thus avoid introducing artificial aggregate uncertainty due to small deviations from the law
of large numbers. To eliminate sampling error, we use the same series of aggregate shocks for all
iterations and all model simulations.
The algorithm is implemented in a mixture of C/C++ and MATLAB, which are then connected
through MATLAB’s CMEX interface.39
B.2 Results for the stochastic steady state
B.2.1 Estimated laws of motions for the two-shock equilibrium
HΓ for aggregate capital in good times (state zg), with low (Gl), medium (Gm), and high (Gh)
government purchases levels are, respectively (in the above order):
log(K ′) = 0.1310 + 0.9219log(K)− 0.0015B + 0.0104(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gl)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0007Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.1251 + 0.9256log(K)− 0.0014B + 0.0098(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gm)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0007Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.1200 + 0.9287log(K)− 0.0015B + 0.0093(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gh)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0006Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999.
HΓ for aggregate capital in bad times (state zb), with low, medium, and high government purchases
levels are, respectively:
log(K ′) = 0.1050 + 0.9357log(K)− 0.0015B + 0.0082(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gl)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0010Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.1024 + 0.9366log(K)− 0.0014B + 0.0081(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gm)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0009Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.0968 + 0.9402log(K)− 0.0014B + 0.0075(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gh)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0008Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999.
38Although each simulation has 19,000 periods, we discard the initial 1,000 observations in the estimation.
39On a 12-core 2.67 GHz Intel Xeon X5650 Linux workstation, the typical run time for the value function iteration
lies around several hours (it gets shorter as the initial guess gets more accurate), while that for one simulation loop
is about 40 minutes. Starting from a guess close to the equilibrium, it takes about 40 iterations to converge.
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HΓ for the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution in good times (state zg), with low, medium,
and high government purchases levels are, respectively:
Gini(a′) = −0.0661 + 0.0387log(K) + 0.0035B − 0.0046(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gl)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0013log(K)B + 0.9975Gini(a), R2 = 0.999998,
Gini(a′) = −0.0712 + 0.0428log(K) + 0.0036B − 0.0054(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gm)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0013log(K)B + 0.9974Gini(a), R2 = 0.999998,
Gini(a′) = −0.0744 + 0.0455log(K) + 0.0035B − 0.0059(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gh)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0013log(K)B + 0.9974Gini(a), R2 = 0.999998.
HΓ for the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution in bad times (state zb), with low, medium,
and high government purchases levels are, respectively:
Gini(a′) = −0.1201 + 0.0846log(K) + 0.0039B − 0.0143(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gl)
− 0.0000B3 − 0.0015log(K)B + 0.9991Gini(a), R2 = 0.999992,
Gini(a′) = −0.1195 + 0.0844log(K) + 0.0039B − 0.0142(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gm)
− 0.0000B3 − 0.0015log(K)B + 0.9991Gini(a), R2 = 0.999993,
Gini(a′) = −0.1177 + 0.0829log(K) + 0.0039B − 0.0139(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gh)
− 0.0000B3 − 0.0015log(K)B + 0.9991Gini(a), R2 = 0.999993.
Θ in good times (state zg), with low, medium, and high government purchases levels are, respec-
tively:
τ1 = 0.2708− 0.1890log(K) + 0.0080B + 0.0712(log(K))2 − 0.0003B2 (Gl)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0058log(K)B − 0.0063Gini(a), R2 = 0.999991,
τ1 = 0.2835− 0.1895log(K) + 0.0067B + 0.0709(log(K))2 − 0.0003B2 (Gm)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0063log(K)B − 0.0069Gini(a), R2 = 0.999988,
τ1 = 0.3038− 0.1960log(K) + 0.0049B + 0.0718(log(K))2 − 0.0003B2 (Gh)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0069log(K)B − 0.0075Gini(a), R2 = 0.999987.
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Θ in bad times (state zb), with low, medium, and high government purchases levels are, respec-
tively:
τ1 = 0.3093− 0.2284log(K) + 0.0096B + 0.0794(log(K))2 − 0.0003B2 (Gl)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0065log(K)B − 0.0072Gini(a), R2 = 0.999988,
τ1 = 0.3218− 0.2280log(K) + 0.0080B + 0.0790(log(K))2 − 0.0003B2 (Gm)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0071log(K)B − 0.0079Gini(a), R2 = 0.999986,
τ1 = 0.3226− 0.2179log(K) + 0.0070B + 0.0766(log(K))2 − 0.0003B2 (Gh)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0075log(K)B − 0.0088Gini(a), R2 = 0.999985.
B.2.2 Multi-step ahead forecast errors
To compute the multi-step ahead forecast errors, we compare the aggregate paths from the equilib-
rium simulation with those generated by the approximate equilibrium rules. To be specific, starting
from the first period, we pick a set of aggregate states 80 periods apart along the final simulation
of the stochastic steady state calculation, {K(i−1)×80+1, B(i−1)×80+1, Gini(i−1)×80+1(a)}i∈{1,2,... }.
We then simulate each set of aggregate states for 40 periods with the equilibrium laws of motions
HΓ and HB (with the same aggregate shock sequences as those in the equilibrium simulation), and
record the aggregate capital level in the last period of each simulation {KH(i−1)×80+1+40}i∈{1,2,... }.
We then calculate the ith 10-year (40-period) ahead forecast error for aggregate capital as u40i =
K(i−1)×80+1+40 − KH(i−1)×80+1+40, where Kt is the aggregate capital level at period t from the
equilibrium simulation. Note that the forecast errors generated this way are independent of each
other because 40 periods are discarded between each simulation. With the large number of simu-
lations in the stochastic steady state calculation (12 parallel simulations each for 18,000 periods),
we generate about 2,700 such forecast errors. The mean of these 10-year-ahead forecast errors is
0.0004%, and the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the 10-year-ahead forecast is about 0.05%
of the long-run average capital level, suggesting little bias and high overall forecast accuracy in
our laws of motions.
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B.2.3 Estimated laws of motions for the one-shock equilibrium
HΓ for aggregate capital in good times (state zg) and bad times (state zb) are, respectively:
log(K ′) = 0.1273 + 0.9238log(K)− 0.0015B + 0.0101(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (zg)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0007Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.1020 + 0.9370log(K)− 0.0014B + 0.0080(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (zb)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0009Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999.
HΓ for Gini coefficient of wealth distribution in good times (state zg) and bad times (state zb) are,
respectively:
Gini(a′) = −0.0735 + 0.0447log(K) + 0.0035B − 0.0058(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (zg)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0012log(K)B + 0.9976Gini(a), R2 = 0.999998,
Gini(a′) = −0.1308 + 0.0935log(K) + 0.0040B − 0.0161(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (zb)
− 0.0000B3 − 0.0015log(K)B + 0.9993Gini(a), R2 = 0.999991.
Θ in good times (state zg) and bad times (state zb) are, respectively:
τ1 = 0.2763− 0.1833log(K) + 0.0068B + 0.0696(log(K))2 − 0.0003B2 (zg)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0062log(K)B − 0.0072Gini(a), R2 = 0.999987,
τ1 = 0.3096− 0.2176log(K) + 0.0083B + 0.0768(log(K))2 − 0.0003B2 (zb)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0070log(K)B − 0.0083Gini(a), R2 = 0.999984.
B.3 Computational algorithm for the transition-path equilibrium
Step 0: Set up:
We choose the starting G level (three possibilities) and guess a length for the transition period
Ttrans.
We next assume specific functional forms for {HtransΓ,t ,Θtranst }Ttranst=1 .
We then select the interpolation grid for (a,K,Gini(a), B) used in the spline approximation of
the household’s continuation value function.
This calculation also requires the following inputs:
1. H1sΓ and Θ
1s: laws of motions from the one-shock equilibrium.
2. V1s(a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z;H
1s
Γ ,Θ
1s): the value function for households from the one-shock
equilibrium.
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3. Ntrans independent joint distributions over (a, ε, β˜) (each with NH households) drawn from
the two-shock equilibrium simulation to start the transition-path equilibrium simula-
tions. To get a balanced sample for each combination of z and t, exactly half of these
distributions are collected during good times (z = zg).
4. Ntrans different aggregate productivity shock paths {{zit}Ttranst=1 }Ntransi=1 , where zi1 matches
with the productivity level in the ith collected joint distribution and the zit>1 are
randomly drawn following its Markov process.
Step 1: We start from an initial coefficient guess {{a00,t, . . . , a07,t}, {a˜00,t, . . . , a˜07,t}, {b0,t0 , . . . , b07,t}}Ttranst=1
to get our initial conjectures {Htrans,0Γ,t ,Θtrans,0t }Ttranst=1 . Set up a convergence criterion ε.
Step 2: In the nth iteration, we compute the household’s value function at each period by backward
induction, with imposed laws of motions {Htrans,nΓ,t ,Θtrans,nt }Ttranst=1 . To be specific, ∀t ∈ {1,
. . . , Ttrans}, given the continuation value V trans,nt+1 (a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z;Htrans,nΓ,t+1 ,Θtrans,nt+1 ), we
calculate V trans,nt (a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z;H
trans,n
Γ,t ,Θ
trans,n
t ). Note that V
trans,n
Ttrans+1
(·) = V1s(·). We
store the value functions at each point in time of the transition path.
Step 3: In this step, we simulate the Ntrans economies with the corresponding productivity shock
paths. For the simulation of the ith economy, in each period t, we first calculate the equilibrium
τeq,n,i1,t using equation (2.11) and H
trans,n
Γ,t . Then we solve the household’s optimization problem for
(Kn,it , Gini
n,i
t (a), B
n,i
t , z
n,i
t , τ
eq,n,i
1,t ) using V
trans,n
t+1 (a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z;H
trans,n
Γ,t+1 ,Θ
trans,n
t+1 ) and
{Htrans,nΓ,t ,Θtrans,nt , HB}. The aggregate states in the next period follow from aggregating the
optimal household decisions. We finally collect the following panel data {Kn,it , Ginin,it (a), Bn,it ,
zn,it , τ
eq,n,i
1,t }Tt=1}Ntransi=1 .
Step 4: ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , Ttrans}, we run OLS for each point in time along the transition path to get
estimates of {aˆn0,t, . . . , aˆn7,t}, {ˆ˜an0,t, . . . , ˆ˜an7,t}, {bˆn0,t, . . . , bˆn7,t}, which, with a slight abuse of notation,
we summarize as {Hˆtrans,nΓ,t , Θˆtrans,nt }Ttranst=1 .
Step 5: If maxt |Htrans,nΓ,t − Hˆtrans,nΓ,t | < ε and maxt |Θtrans,nt − Θˆtrans,nt | < ε, we stop. Otherwise,
∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, we set:
Htrans,n+1Γ,t = αH × Hˆtrans,nΓ,t + (1− αH)×Htrans,nΓ,t
Θtrans,n+1t = αΘ × Θˆtrans,nt + (1− αΘ)×Θtrans,nt
with αH , αΘ ∈ (0, 1], and go to Step 2.
Step 6: We check the convergence of the last period’s laws of motion to those from the one-
shock equilibrium. To be specific, starting from the aggregate states observed in the last period’s
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simulations, {ziT ,KiT , BiT , GiniiT (a)}Ntransi=1 , we calculate the differences in the predicted values of
aggregate capital, the wealth Gini coefficient and τ1, between when we use the converged last
period’s laws of motions of the transition-path equilibrium, {HtransΓ,Ttrans ,ΘtransTtrans}, and when we use
the laws of motions from the one-shock economy, {HΓ,1s,Θ1s}. If the differences are comparable in
size to those of the one-step prediction errors of the laws of motions from the one-shock stochastic
steady state equilibrium, we go to Step 7. Otherwise, we go back to Step 0 and increase Ttrans.
Step 7: We check whether the R2s (the multiple-step-ahead forecast errors) of the final OLS
regressions are sufficiently high (small) for the equilibrium rules to be well approximated. If they
are not, we change the functional forms in Step 0 and repeat the algorithm.40
The numerical methods for interpolation and optimization used to solve the household’s maxi-
mization problem in Step 2 and Step 3 are the same as those in the computation of the stochastic
steady state. The only difference is that the procedure does not involve a value function iteration
since we use backward induction to solve for the value function for each period, starting from the
value function from the stochastic steady state without fiscal volatility.
40We choose ε = 10−4 and NH = 90, 000. Ttrans is set to be shorter (200) when we start from Gm compared
to the two other cases (400), because in the former case the G-process immediately transition to its deterministic
conditional expectation. Ntrans is set to be 8,000 when we start from Gm and 4,000 for the other two cases, to
keep the ratios between the numbers of observations across different cases the same as those implied by the ergodic
distribution of the G-process. On a 32-core 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-4640 Linux workstation, the typical run time for
the value function calculation takes about an hour, and for one simulation loop, it takes about six hours. Starting
from a guess based on the weighted average between the two-shock and the one-shock laws of motion, it takes about
40 to 50 iterations to converge.
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B.4 Estimated laws of motions for transition-path equilibrium
Here we present the estimated laws of motions for selected periods and every combination of zt
and G1.
Table 11: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gl, zt = zg
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1309 0.9220 -0.0015 0.0104 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0008 0.2205 0.999999
2 0.1321 0.9210 -0.0015 0.0106 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2210 0.999999
3 0.1350 0.9186 -0.0016 0.0111 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2214 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 0.1285 0.9228 -0.0016 0.0103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1274 0.9237 -0.0015 0.0101 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1290 0.9225 -0.0016 0.0104 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.0673 0.0396 0.0036 -0.0047 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0013 0.9974 0.2205 0.999998
2 -0.0620 0.0353 0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012 0.9974 0.2210 0.999998
3 -0.0719 0.0434 0.0036 -0.0055 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0013 0.9974 0.2214 0.999998
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 -0.0741 0.0452 0.0034 -0.0059 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0012 0.9975 0.2319 0.999998
399 -0.0689 0.0410 0.0033 -0.0050 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012 0.9975 0.2319 0.999998
400 -0.0762 0.0469 0.0035 -0.0062 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0012 0.9975 0.2319 0.999998
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 0.2922 -0.2064 0.0067 0.0746 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0063 -0.0060 0.2205 0.999991
2 0.2975 -0.2103 0.0067 0.0754 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0063 -0.0061 0.2210 0.999991
3 0.3049 -0.2159 0.0064 0.0766 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0064 -0.0061 0.2214 0.999990
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 0.2774 -0.1848 0.0071 0.0699 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0061 -0.0066 0.2319 0.999987
399 0.2653 -0.1749 0.0072 0.0679 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0061 -0.0065 0.2319 0.999987
400 0.2691 -0.1780 0.0071 0.0685 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0061 -0.0066 0.2319 0.999987
Table 12: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gl, zt = zb
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1042 0.9363 -0.0015 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2205 0.999999
2 0.1108 0.9309 -0.0016 0.0092 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0010 0.2210 0.999999
3 0.1067 0.9342 -0.0015 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2214 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 0.1011 0.9377 -0.0015 0.0079 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1026 0.9366 -0.0015 0.0081 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1030 0.9362 -0.0015 0.0082 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.1310 0.0937 0.0043 -0.0161 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0016 0.9989 0.2205 0.999992
2 -0.1253 0.0889 0.0043 -0.0151 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0016 0.9989 0.2210 0.999992
3 -0.1152 0.0804 0.0043 -0.0133 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0016 0.9990 0.2214 0.999992
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 -0.1146 0.0802 0.0038 -0.0133 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0014 0.9991 0.2319 0.999991
399 -0.1300 0.0928 0.0042 -0.0159 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0016 0.9991 0.2319 0.999991
400 -0.1261 0.0896 0.0042 -0.0153 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0016 0.9990 0.2319 0.999991
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 0.3518 -0.2630 0.0077 0.0864 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0073 -0.0069 0.2205 0.999998
2 0.3475 -0.2593 0.0081 0.0857 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0071 -0.0068 0.2210 0.999998
3 0.3635 -0.2719 0.0076 0.0883 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0073 -0.0069 0.2214 0.999998
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 0.3240 -0.2302 0.0082 0.0795 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0070 -0.0076 0.2319 0.999997
399 0.3308 -0.2357 0.0080 0.0806 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0071 -0.0076 0.2319 0.999997
400 0.3304 -0.2354 0.0081 0.0805 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0071 -0.0075 0.2319 0.999997
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Table 13: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gm, zt = zg
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1251 0.9256 -0.0015 0.0098 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
2 0.1232 0.9272 -0.0014 0.0094 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
3 0.1259 0.9250 -0.0015 0.0099 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
198 0.1264 0.9246 -0.0014 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
199 0.1258 0.9250 -0.0014 0.0099 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
200 0.1276 0.9236 -0.0015 0.0102 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.0735 0.0448 0.0036 -0.0058 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013 0.9973 0.2319 0.999998
2 -0.0778 0.0482 0.0038 -0.0065 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0014 0.9973 0.2319 0.999997
3 -0.0772 0.0478 0.0037 -0.0064 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0013 0.9974 0.2319 0.999998
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
198 -0.0722 0.0436 0.0035 -0.0055 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0013 0.9976 0.2319 0.999998
199 -0.0718 0.0433 0.0035 -0.0055 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012 0.9975 0.2319 0.999998
200 -0.0753 0.0462 0.0035 -0.0061 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0013 0.9975 0.2319 0.999998
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 0.2888 -0.1940 0.0063 0.0718 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0064 -0.0064 0.2319 0.999984
2 0.2859 -0.1916 0.0062 0.0713 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0064 -0.0065 0.2319 0.999985
3 0.2871 -0.1925 0.0062 0.0715 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0065 -0.0065 0.2319 0.999984
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
198 0.3019 -0.2045 0.0061 0.0739 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0065 -0.0067 0.2319 0.999986
199 0.3017 -0.2043 0.0062 0.0739 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0065 -0.0067 0.2319 0.999986
200 0.3017 -0.2044 0.0063 0.0739 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0064 -0.0067 0.2319 0.999986
Table 14: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gm, zt = zb
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1009 0.9378 -0.0015 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
2 0.1022 0.9368 -0.0015 0.0081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
3 0.1008 0.9379 -0.0015 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
198 0.1037 0.9355 -0.0015 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
199 0.1044 0.9350 -0.0015 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
200 0.1024 0.9366 -0.0015 0.0081 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.1258 0.0895 0.0040 -0.0153 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0015 0.9989 0.2319 0.999993
2 -0.1116 0.0779 0.0037 -0.0129 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0014 0.9989 0.2319 0.999993
3 -0.1149 0.0805 0.0038 -0.0134 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0014 0.9990 0.2319 0.999993
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
198 -0.1260 0.0895 0.0040 -0.0152 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0015 0.9992 0.2319 0.999991
199 -0.1233 0.0873 0.0038 -0.0148 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0014 0.9992 0.2319 0.999991
200 -0.1286 0.0917 0.0039 -0.0157 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0015 0.9992 0.2319 0.999991
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 0.3134 -0.2213 0.0076 0.0776 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0073 -0.0074 0.2319 0.999985
2 0.3033 -0.2130 0.0080 0.0759 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0071 -0.0074 0.2319 0.999984
3 0.3080 -0.2168 0.0077 0.0766 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0072 -0.0074 0.2319 0.999984
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
198 0.3394 -0.2422 0.0073 0.0818 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0074 -0.0078 0.2319 0.999984
199 0.3372 -0.2405 0.0074 0.0815 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0073 -0.0078 0.2319 0.999984
200 0.3380 -0.2411 0.0073 0.0816 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0074 -0.0078 0.2319 0.999985
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Table 15: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gh, zt = zg
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1234 0.9259 -0.0016 0.0098 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2433 0.999999
2 0.1269 0.9231 -0.0017 0.0104 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2429 0.999999
3 0.1216 0.9275 -0.0016 0.0095 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2424 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 0.1254 0.9254 -0.0015 0.0098 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1262 0.9248 -0.0015 0.0099 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1227 0.9276 -0.0015 0.0094 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.0704 0.0422 0.0035 -0.0052 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012 0.9973 0.2433 0.999998
2 -0.0639 0.0369 0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0012 0.9974 0.2429 0.999998
3 -0.0753 0.0463 0.0034 -0.0061 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012 0.9973 0.2424 0.999998
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 -0.0634 0.0364 0.0032 -0.0041 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012 0.9975 0.2319 0.999998
399 -0.0662 0.0389 0.0032 -0.0046 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0011 0.9974 0.2319 0.999998
400 -0.0669 0.0393 0.0033 -0.0047 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0012 0.9975 0.2319 0.999998
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 0.3271 -0.2157 0.0044 0.0759 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0071 -0.0069 0.2433 0.999987
2 0.3180 -0.2085 0.0043 0.0744 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0072 -0.0069 0.2429 0.999986
3 0.3017 -0.1954 0.0047 0.0717 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0070 -0.0069 0.2424 0.999987
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 0.2713 -0.1792 0.0062 0.0687 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0065 -0.0068 0.2319 0.999988
399 0.2854 -0.1906 0.0058 0.0710 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0066 -0.0068 0.2319 0.999987
400 0.2826 -0.1883 0.0058 0.0705 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0066 -0.0068 0.2319 0.999987
Table 16: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gh, zt = zb
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.0959 0.9408 -0.0014 0.0074 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2433 0.999999
2 0.0958 0.9409 -0.0014 0.0074 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2429 0.999999
3 0.0975 0.9396 -0.0014 0.0076 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2424 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 0.1056 0.9341 -0.0016 0.0086 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1063 0.9335 -0.0016 0.0088 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1089 0.9313 -0.0017 0.0092 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.1045 0.0719 0.0035 -0.0117 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013 0.9990 0.2433 0.999993
2 -0.1206 0.0853 0.0039 -0.0144 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0015 0.9989 0.2429 0.999993
3 -0.1250 0.0887 0.0041 -0.0151 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0016 0.9990 0.2424 0.999993
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 -0.1359 0.0978 0.0039 -0.0170 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0015 0.9992 0.2319 0.999992
399 -0.1321 0.0946 0.0036 -0.0164 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013 0.9993 0.2319 0.999991
400 -0.1343 0.0964 0.0036 -0.0167 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013 0.9993 0.2319 0.999992
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 0.3326 -0.2265 0.0062 0.0783 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0078 -0.0081 0.2433 0.999985
2 0.3516 -0.2426 0.0060 0.0816 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0079 -0.0081 0.2429 0.999985
3 0.3729 -0.2604 0.0055 0.0853 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0081 -0.0081 0.2424 0.999984
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
398 0.3322 -0.2360 0.0073 0.0805 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0074 -0.0079 0.2319 0.999985
399 0.3306 -0.2349 0.0077 0.0803 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0072 -0.0079 0.2319 0.999984
400 0.3388 -0.2416 0.0075 0.0817 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0073 -0.0079 0.2319 0.999985
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B.5 Calculating the welfare gain
In this appendix, we show how to use the value functions from the recursive decision problems
in the transition-path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium to conduct the welfare cost
calculation implicitly defined in equation (5.1), which we restate here for convenience:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu((1 + λ)ct, Gt)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(c˜t, G˜t)]. (5.1)
We denote the value functions from the transition-path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium
by V˜ and V , respectively, where
V˜ = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(c˜t, G˜t)],
and
V = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(ct, Gt)].
Note that the right side of (5.1) is exactly V˜ . Under the assumption of a log separable utility
function, the left side of (5.1) can be expressed as:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu((1+λ)ct, Gt)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(ct, Gt)]+E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtθ log(1+λ)] = θ log(1+λ)E1[
∞∑
t=1
βt]+V.
This allows us to rewrite (5.1) as:
θ log(1 + λ)E1[
∞∑
t=1
βt] + V = V˜ .
Thus, λ can be calculated as follows:
λ = exp
(
V˜ − V
θE1[
∑∞
t=1 βt]
)
− 1.
Note that, since β1 is known at time 1, the value of the denominator in the parentheses is a
function of β1. The calculation of λ is straightforward using the transition matrix governing the
Markov process for β˜.
Under a non-separable utility function, we solve for λ numerically. That is, we calculate the left
side of (5.1) as a discounted sum of flow utilities under various values of λ by using the equilibrium
policy function, and then find a value of λ that satisfies the equation, using a bisection search.
C Appendix: The income risk channel illustrated
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate the distributional implications of the income risk
channel, separately for the precautionary saving effect and the rate-of-return risk effect, using a
simple partial equilibrium model. We construct a stripped-down version of our linear-tax model by
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keeping only elements pertaining to the income risk channel.41 We first specify the infinitely-lived
household’s recursive problem below, followed by explanations:
V (a, s) = maxc,a′ log(c) + βE[V (a
′, s′)] (C.1)
s.t. c+ a′ = (1− τw)w + (1 + r(1− τr))a (C.2)
a′ ≥ a, (C.3)
where, with a slight abuse of notation, s is the process that is assumed to be stochastic in each
of the following partial equilibrium exercises (see below), while τw and τr are tax rates on labor
and capital income (that could be stochastic in some specifications), respectively. All the other
variables are defined in the same way as in the main text of the paper.
This setup captures the essential elements in the household maximization problem of the
linear-tax model, except that now we conduct exercises that only feature one relevant source of
uncertainty at a time. As explained in the main text, volatilities in factor prices (w and r) and
tax rates (τw and τr) all contribute to income risk. To be specific, to illustrate the precautionary
saving effect, we first solve the model with and without uncertainty in τw and compare welfare
(exercise A). Then, we examine the effect of eliminating the volatility of the joint series w(1− τw)
(exercise B). To illustrate the rate-of-return risk effect, we run analogous exercises on the capital
income side: remove uncertainty in τr (exercise C) and then in r(1− τr) (exercise D).
Note that the focus of those exercises is merely to illustrate the qualitative pattern of the
precautionary saving and rate-of-return risk effects. Compared to the fully-fledged general equi-
librium model, this partial equilibrium model lacks, for the sake of expositional clarity, a number
of uncertainty sources including unemployment risk and preference shocks as well as persistence
in and correlations between the after-tax factor price processes.
In all these exercises, we set the parameters based on values from the linear-tax general equi-
librium model. The average values of factor prices and tax rates are calibrated to match the
average values from the linear-tax two-shock model. For exercise A (C), we assume that the tax
rate τw (τr) follows an i.i.d. process with a standard deviation that is calibrated to the square root
of the variance difference of the tax-rate series between the two-shock and the one-shock linear
tax model.42 For exercises B and D, we use the same approach except that now the after-tax
factor prices, w(1− τw) and r(1− τr) respectively, are modeled as random variables. Lastly, the
41We chose the linear-tax model because it captures the same mechanisms at work and has similar welfare
implications as the baseline case with adjusting τ1 (which, given the U.S. tax system, is itself a result of the paper;
see explanations and results in Section 6), yet it is very simple and transparent.
42Then the elimination of volatility in the partial equilibrium model can arguably be viewed as a similar thought
experiment as the one considered in the main text. We specify 1+τw (1+τr) as a log-normally distributed variable,
and discretize the distribution using Gaussian quadrature with three grid points.
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borrowing constraint and the time discount factor are also from the linear-tax model, where for
the latter we use the value of the medium grid.
Table 17: Welfare gains (λc, % ×10, 000) from the four partial equilibrium exercises
Wealth (pctiles) 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
A : τw 0.5575 0.5312 0.4905 0.4599 0.4228 0.1726 0.0382
B : w(1− τw) 1.2420 1.1839 1.0928 1.0247 0.9419 0.3846 0.0852
C : τr 0.0018 0.0024 0.0048 0.0077 0.0128 0.1187 0.3199
D : r(1− τr) 0.0041 0.0056 0.0110 0.0178 0.0297 0.2748 0.7404
Table 17 reports the welfare gains across wealth percentiles from the elimination of the volatility
of τw, w(1− τw), τr, and r(1− τr). The slope of the welfare gains from the precautionary saving
effect across wealth is negative (exercises A and B). This confirms our intuition that the wealth-
poor households are more exposed to the after-tax labor income uncertainty. The effect is more
than twice as large (as that in exercise A) when we consider the uncertainty jointly in the tax rate
and the before-tax labor income (exercise B).
The slope of the welfare gains from the rate-of-return effect across wealth is positive (exercises
C and D). This shows that the rate-of-return risk effect favors the wealth-rich households. This
result is again intuitive. Wealthy households, to finance their consumption, rely more on returns to
saving, which are subject to the rate-of-return risk due to uncertain tax and interest rates. Hence
they gain more from the elimination of this risk. We want to emphasize that this is not an artifact
of our assumption that there is only one financial asset. Even if we allowed a portfolio choice
among multiple financial assets (including a bond for which the before-tax-return was fixed), as
long as the returns to all the financial assets were subject to after-tax-rate-of-return uncertainty,
the same result would hold. In short, wealth-rich households are more exposed to the rate-of-
return risk in a realistic incomplete asset market model, so they gain more from the elimination
of this risk.
These results are also robust to other details of the model. For example, changing the level of
the borrowing constraint or allowing a certain degree of persistence in the capital-tax rate process
does not affect the qualitative patterns of the result.
D Appendix: Alternative specifications and additional ex-
periments
D.1 λ under different model specifications
Table 18 reports the λ-measure of welfare gains under different model specifications.
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Table 18: Expected welfare gains, λ (%), under different model specifications
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
Baseline 0.0293 0.0289 0.0295 0.0296 0.0293 0.0290 0.0287 0.0313 0.0371
Different Tax Function Adjustment
Adjusting τ0 0.0295 0.0291 0.0296 0.0298 0.0295 0.0293 0.0288 0.0303 0.0347
Adjusting τ2 0.0299 0.0300 0.0305 0.0306 0.0304 0.0301 0.0291 0.0263 0.0277
Adjusting τ3 0.0298 0.0303 0.0307 0.0307 0.0304 0.0301 0.0290 0.0240 0.0242
Other Fiscal Regimes
Balanced Budget 0.0323 0.0318 0.0319 0.0320 0.0319 0.0318 0.0322 0.0371 0.0455
Linear Tax 0.0284 0.0277 0.0279 0.0282 0.0282 0.0282 0.0283 0.0315 0.0375
Lump-sum Tax 0.0280 0.0276 0.0276 0.0277 0.0276 0.0275 0.0279 0.0336 0.0412
Non-separable Utility Function
Substitute (ρ = 0.5) 0.0079 0.0083 0.0093 0.0091 0.0073 0.0086 0.0066 0.0074 0.0087
Complement (ρ = 1.5) 0.1231 0.2076 0.1493 0.1205 0.1125 0.1214 0.1260 0.1464 0.1435
Alternative TFP and labor income processes
Rich income dynamics 0.0261 0.0263 0.0264 0.0265 0.0263 0.0259 0.0253 0.0259 0.0320
Constant TFP 0.0299 0.0292 0.0299 0.0300 0.0298 0.0295 0.0295 0.0331 0.0403
Additional Experiments
Double Volatility of G -0.0281 -0.0278 -0.0284 -0.0285 -0.0281 -0.0278 -0.0275 -0.0301 -0.0360
Sudden change in G 0.0337 0.0348 0.0351 0.0347 0.0339 0.0333 0.0323 0.0336 0.0397
D.2 Doubling fiscal volatility
To implement the experiment of doubling fiscal volatility, we start by solving a new two-shock
equilibrium with a government purchases variance twice that in the baseline model, while keeping
the other parameter values the same as in the baseline calibration. We use the Rouwenhorst
method to discretize the new AR(1) process and to obtain a new grid for G (Gnewl , G
new
m , G
new
h )
=((1 − mnew)Gm, Gm, (1 + mnew)Gm), with the same transition probability matrix as in the
baseline model. We then start from the ergodic distribution of the original two-shock equilibrium
and let the economy gradually transit to the new two-shock equilibrium as follows: at t = 1, after a
particular G-state is realized from the old grid, (Gl, Gm, Gh), the households in the economy learn
that, from the next period on (t ≥ 2), the G-states will evolve according to a different process,
with the same transition probabilities, but with new period-t grid values that are conditional on
the period-1 state, G1, as (G
new
l , G
new
m , G
new
h ) + G
adj
t,G1
. Gadjt,G1 is an adjustment term that makes
the period-t conditional mean as of t = 1 equal to those of the original process.43 Mechanically,
Gadjt,G1 is zero for all t when G1 = Gm, and positive (negative) and decreasing (increasing) to zero
when G1 = Gl (G1 = Gh). We plot G
adj
t,G1
in Figure 7.
We follow similar steps as in the baseline case to solve the model. Note that, unlike in the
baseline case, we now have an uncertain government purchases level along the transition path
in addition to the aggregate productivity shocks. However, we do not condition on Gt in the
coefficients of transition-equilibrium laws of motions. Instead, we incorporate Gt as a regressor in
HΓt+1 and Θt+1, and pool the regressions for the laws of motion for t = 1, 2, . . . , 30. Note that
we do condition the laws of motion on the period-1 value of government purchases (G1). We find
43Note that this adjustment term isolates the effect of a change in fiscal volatility from a sudden level adjustment.
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Figure 7: Government purchases adjustment (Gadjt,G1)
that the following (relatively parsimonious) functional forms perform well:
log(K ′t+1) =a0,t(zt, G1) + a1,t(zt, G1)log(Kt) + a2,t(zt, G1)Bt + a3,t(zt, G1)Gini(at)
+ a4,t(zt, G1)B
5
t + a5,t(zt, G1)G
2
t + a6,t(zt, G1)B
5
tG
2
t ,
Gini(a′t+1) =a˜0,t(zt, G1) + a˜1,t(zt, G1)log(Kt) + a˜2,t(zt, G1)Bt + a˜3,t(zt, G1)Gini(at)
+ a˜4,t(zt, G1)B
5
t + a˜5,t(zt, G1)G
2
t + a˜6,t(zt, G1)B
5
tG
2
t ,
τ1,t =b0,t(zt, G1) + b1,t(zt, G1)log(Kt) + b2,t(zt, G1)Bt + b3,t(zt, G1)Gini(at)
+ b4,t(zt, G1)B
2
t + b5,t(zt, G1)G
2
t + b6,t(zt, G1)B
5
tG
2
t .
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